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I. Introduction
Judicial promulgation of generally applicable rules involving
the administration and operation of American judicial systems
has been increasingly criticized during the past decade as both
too secretive and too closed. There now exists a solid consensus
that greater "public process"1 is needed in judicial rulemaking.2
Perhaps in response, some judges and legislators are changing
the ways in which judges adopt or help adopt rules by making
judicial rulemaking procedures more open and more accessible.'
1. See, e.g., Weinstein, Reform of Federal Court Rule-Making Procedures, 76
COLUM. L. REv. 905, 933 (1976). As used in this article, public process means public
access to, and participation in, the various judicial rulemaking procedures that are used
to adopt judicial rules.
2. Some of the earliest, and the most influential, commentaries include Lesnick, The
Federal Rule-Making Process: A Time for Re-examination, 61 A.B.A. J. 579 (1975), and
a series of works by Judge Jack Weinstein, including Weinstein, supra note 1. Other
significant commentaries include Hazard, Undemocratic Legislation (Book Review), 87
YALE L.J. 1284 (1978) (finding Lesnick's proposals "attractive"); Oakes, Book Review 78
COLUM. L. Rv. 205 (1978) (finding it difficult to disagree with Judge Weinstein); Wright,
Book Review, 9 ST. M AY's L.J. 652 (1978) (adoption of Weinstein's suggestions as a
package would result in a significant improvement); Clinton, Rule 9 of the Federal
Habeas Corpus Rules: A Case Study on the Need for Reform of the Rules Enabling
Acts, 63 IOWA L. Rav. 15 (1977) (criticizing federal judicial rulemaking in the habeas
corpus area); Tague, Perils of the Rulemaking Process: The Development, Application,
and Unconstitutionality of Rule 804(b)(3)'s Penal Interest Exception, 69 GEo. L.J. 851,
909, 913, 1012-13 (1981) (criticizing the secretive way in which the evidentiary rule on
statements against penal interest was proposed to Congress).
For recent commentary regarding public process in state judicial rulemaking, see
Spitzer, Court Rulemaking in Washington State, 6 U. PUGr SouND L. REV. 31 (1982);
Parness & Manthey, Public Process and Ohio Supreme Court Rulemaking, 28 CLEV. ST.
L. REv. 249 (1979); Hellman, The Oklahoma Supreme Court's New Rules on Lawyer
Advertising: Some Practical, Legal, and Policy Questions, 31 OKLA. L. REv. 509 (1978).
3. See, e.g., Procedures for the Conduct of Business by the Judicial Conference
Committees on Rules of Practice & Procedure, 98 F.R.D. 347 (1983); 28 U.S.C. § 2077(b)
(1982) (requiring each court of appeals to appoint an advisory committee for the study of
the rules of practice and internal operating procedures); Nev. Rules on the Administra-
tive Docket, reprinted in 1 Nav. Rav. STAT. (1979) [hereinafter cited as NEv. R. AD.
DocKET]; Rule on Proc. R., Admin. R. & Admin. Ord. of the N.D. Sup. Ct. (adopted
3
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For example, some judicial rulemaking procedures have become
better known through their formal establishment by law; meet-
ings at which judicial rules are discussed have been opened to
the public;5 meaningful notice and opportunity to be heard have
been afforded interested persons prior to judicial rule promulga-
tion;' and records of judicial rulemaking activity have been
maintained.7
Although there is widespread agreement that the movement
toward more open and accessible rulemaking procedures is long
overdue, there is also recognition that the particular means of
implementing public process judicial rulemaking procedures
may need to vary. One factor bearing on the need for variation is
the scope of the judicial rulemaker's authority: public process
for narrow, technical rules should be different from public pro-
cess for rules affecting sensitive issues of social policy.' A second
factor is the nature of the judicial rulemaker's authority: public
process should be different for fettered or advisory judicial
March 15, 1978) [hereinafter cited as NDRPR]; WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 2.52.010 (Supp.
1984-1985) (creation of Judicial Council); Wash. Sup. Ct. Gen. R. 9.1 to 9.9 (supreme
court rulemaking procedure). One notable legislative failure involves the efforts to mod-
ify all of the Federal Rules Enabling Act. See Clinton, supra note 2, at 83-84 n.387
(describing proposals of former Representative Holtzman).
4. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2077(b) (1982) (appellate court advisory committees); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 9-3-65 (1975) (advisory committee on civil procedure rules); NDRPR, supra
note 3, at § 8 (standing committees on joint procedure, attorney standards, judiciary
standards, and court services); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 2.52.010 (Supp. 1984-1985) (ju-
dicial council).
5. NDRPR, supra note 3, at § 3 (requiring notice of most proposed rules, and either
supreme court or standing committee hearings); Wash. Sup. Ct. Gen. R. 9.7(b) (Supreme
court may hold hearings on proposed rules.); NEv. R. AD. DOCKET, supra note 3, at § 7.2
(Supreme court's study committee may hold hearings.).
6. NDRPR, supra note 3, at § 7.1 (notice of proposed rule changes to be sent to
various lawyer and non-lawyer groups within the state); id. at § 3.1 (Any person can
petition the supreme court for a rule change.); Wash. Sup. Ct. Gen. R. 9.6 (Proposed
rules approved by supreme court are to be published for comment during January, and
comments may be forwarded until last day in April.).
7. NEv. R. AD. DOCKET, supra note 3, at § 2 (Docket kept noting all rulemaking
activity; other records kept as required by the chief justice.); Wash. Sup. Ct. Gen. R.
9.6(c) (All comments regarding proposed rules to be kept on file in the office of the clerk
of court for public inspection and copying.). See also JUD. CONF. OF U.S., REP. OF PRO-
CEEDINGS 54-55 (1980) (Judicial Conference decides to make available on request Advi-
sory Committee documents and Standing Committee recommendations).
8. Wright, supra note 2, at 656; Parness, Public Process and State-Court Rulemak-
ing (Correspondence), 88 YALE L.J. 1319, 1322 (1979).
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss1/1
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rulemaking than for unfettered judicial rulemaking. 9
Although the recent attempts at implementing public pro-
cess in judicial rulemaking are commendable, they are often de-
ficient because the factfinding process underlying the rulemak-
ing activity is inadequate. In the following pages we examine
varying procedures for making determinations of adjudicative
and legislative facts on which new judicial rules are based.10
Without significant improvement in the manner in which judi-
cial rulemakers recognize, debate, and resolve these facts, any
progress toward open and accessible rulemaking procedures will
be marginal. Before suggesting the various ways in which a pub-
lic process judicial rulemaking procedure can better promote ac-
curate factual determinations, we briefly review the contempo-
rary forms of judicial rulemakers, rules and rulemaking
procedures and present illustrations of how different judicial
rulemakers have determined relevant adjudicative and legisla-
tive facts underlying new judicial rules. It is our hope that our
suggestions will improve the procedures judicial rulemakers use
9. Unfettered judicial rulemaking encompasses situations where the judicial
rulemaker has final authority to make judicial rules. In contrast, fettered judicial
rulemaking involves a setting in which a judicial rulemaker's proposed rules may become
final, but only after review by a nonjudicial rulemaker, usually the legislature. Advisory
judicial rulemaking embodies judicial rule consideration by a judicial rulemaker with no
power whatsoever to adopt a judicial rule, and often is exercised by an advisory commit-
tee to the rulemaker having the power to adopt final rules. Parness, supra note 8, at
1323; Weinstein, supra note 1, at 929-30 (Even when legislative review of judicial
rulemaking is authorized, such review should be confined to "the basic policy issues.").
10. The distinction between adjudicative and legislative facts may be explained as
follows:
Adjudicative facts are the facts about the parties and their activities, business,
and properties.. . . [They] are roughly the kind of facts that go to a jury in a jury
case. Legislative facts do not usually concern the immediate parties but are gen-
eral facts which help the tribunal decide questions of law and policy and
discretion.
1 K. DAVIS, ADmmSTRATnvE LAw TmATISE § 7.02, at 413 (1958). This distinction was first
developed by Professor Davis in an article entitled An Approach to Problems of Evi-
dence in the Administrative Process, 55 HAnv. L. Rgv. 364, 402-16 (1942). It is based in
part on the opposite results reached in Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908) and Bi-
Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
Adjudicative and legislative facts are involved in many different proceedings, such as
traditional lawmaking and agency rulemaking. Distinctions between adjudicative and
legislative facts are important not only in terms of statutory requirements attending the
different proceedings, see infra note 33, but also because the procedures must vary de-
pending upon the kind of fact in issue. For a discussion of the different factfinding pro-
cedures, see text accompanying notes 224-37.
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to recognize, debate, and resolve factual issues germane to judi-
cial rules.
II. Contemporary Judicial Rules, Judicial Rulemakers,
and Rulemaking Procedures
Our concern is with the manner in which certain kinds of
judicial rules are developed by designated persons or bodies as-
signed the task of discussing and implementing rule develop-
ments. Thus, our discussion must define "judicial rules" and
identify the persons and bodies who work with them.
A. Judicial Rules
We employ the term "judicial rules" to refer to rules that
affect the administration and operation of a judicial system and
which have been formally incorporated into some type of legisla-
tive enactment. Legislative enactments include sets of proce-
dural rules such as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1 as
well as statutory schemes such as the seminal Field Code,'2 and
perhaps constitutional guarantees like the right to trial by jury
in civil cases.' 3 Excluded rules are nonconstitutional rules
adopted during the course of litigation, 4 as well as informally
adopted rules.' 5
Judicial rules are often classified by: the courts in which
they apply, the subject matter of the cases to which they apply,
and their nonsubstantive or procedural nature. Thus, there are
trial and appellate court rules; civil, criminal, bankruptcy and
admiralty rules; and rules of practice and procedure which do
not infringe upon substantive rights. A more functional classifi-
11. For detailed background on Congressional delegation of civil procedure rulemak-
ing power to the Supreme Court, and its subsequent exercise, see Burbank, The Rules
Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. oF PA. L. REv. 1015 (1982).
12. For a brief history of modern civil procedure legislation and the influence of
David Dudley Field, see F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIvL PROCEDURE §§ 1.6-.7 (2d ed. 1977).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
14. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 513-14 (1975) (prudential concerns un-
derlying decisions on standing); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) (work product
and attorney-client privilege); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941)
(abstention).
15. See Proceedings of a Session of the Conference of Metropolitan District Chief
Judges on Rules and Rulemaking, 79 F.R.D. 471, 481-82 (1978) (remarks of Joiner, J.).
[Vol. 5:1
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cation suggests that most judicial rules serve to regulate at least
one of three forms of conduct: (1) the conduct of lawsuits; (2)
the conduct of those people who practice law outside the con-
fines of a lawsuit; or (3) the conduct of those people who staff
the courts.1 Thus, there are judicial rules on pleading, discovery
and trial practice,17 rules of professional conduct for attorneys
and judges,18 and rules regarding record keeping. 19 To regulate
any of these forms of conduct, a judicial rule may seek to pro-
mote one or more of the following goals: procedural fairness,
economy, efficiency, compliance with other judicial rules or sub-
stantive justice.2
B. Judicial Rulemakers
The responsibility for molding judicial rules is often dele-
gated either constitutionally or legislatively to several judicial
rulemakers. Judicial rulemakers are those individuals or groups
who possess some decisionmaking responsibility for judicial
rules. Judicial rulemakers include at least one judge of a court of
the relevant judicial system.2 1 In many American judicial sys-
16. Parness & Manthey, Public Process and State Judicial Rulemaking, 1 PACE L.
REV. 121, 123-24 (1980).
17. Not all rules governing the conduct of lawsuits relate solely to litigation. Thus,
civil procedure rules and evidence rules on privileges apply both in and out of the
courtroom.
18. Of course, not all professional conduct rules relate to legal practice outside the
confines of a lawsuit; rules governing an attorney's duty regarding the use of perjured
testimony serve as but one example. MODEL CODE OF PROFSSIONAL REsPoNsmILrrv EC 7-
26 (1982).
19. See FED. R. Civ. P. 79(a) (Clerk shall keep a book known as the civil docket.).
20. Thus, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are to be "construed to secure the
just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action," FED. R. Civ. P. 1, and the
Illinois Code of Civil Procedure is to be "liberally construed, to the end that controver-
sies may be speedily and finally determined according to the substantive rights of the
parties." ILL. CODE CIV. & CT. R. § 1-106 (1983). At times application of a judicial rule
can serve to promote one or more of the goals while detracting from another. For exam-
ple, a rule may prompt consideration of dismissal on the merits of an apparently merito-
rious claim because of a procedural error.
Regarding administrative agency rules, Dean Cramton has suggested the competing
considerations to be balanced are accuracy, efficiency and acceptability. Cramton, A
Comment on Trial-Type Hearings in Nuclear Power Plant Siting, 58 VA. L. REV. 585,
592-93 (1972).
21. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1982) (Judicial Conference includes the Chief Justice
of the United States, together with circuit and district judges.); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
2.52.010 (Supp. 1984-1985) (Judicial Council includes judges of various courts, state sen-
7
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tems more than one judicial rulemaker is involved in the deci-
sionmaking process concerning a single set of judicial rules. In
these circumstances, judicial rulemakers include those who pos-
sess only fettered or advisory rulemaking power.2 Finally, since
delegations of rulemaking authority vary in many American ju-
dicial systems according to the type of judicial rule, judicial
rulemakers include those who possess rulemaking power over
only some of their system's judicial rules.2"
C. Judicial Rulemaking Procedures
Judicial rulemaking procedures are the methods judicial
rulemakers use to carry out their decisionmaking responsibili-
ties. These methods usually vary from rule to rule even for a
single judicial rulemaker, although quite often common charac-
teristics pervade all instances of decisionmaking. Variations are
justified because certain judicial rules are bound to have dra-
matic social consequences while others are not; 4 certain judicial
rules inevitably will be subject to subsequent oversight by an-
other rulemaker while others will not;2 5 and certain judicial rules
ators, law school deans, members of the bar, the attorney general, and a county clerk).
22. Fettered judicial rulemaking power contains the prospect that a judicial
rulemaker's proposed rules might not become effective because of some subsequent non-
judicial rulemaker's action, typically a legislature's veto. Advisory judicial rulemaking
occurs when the rulemaker is itself without the authority to effect judicial rule changes,
and thus only serves to counsel some later stage judicial or nonjudicial rulemaker on the
need for judicial rule alterations. See supra note 9. The U.S. Judicial Conference is an
advisory judicial rulemaker, 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1982), but the U.S. Supreme Court largely
possesses fettered judicial rulemaking power, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072, 2076 (1982).
23. In Oregon, the supreme court is chiefly responsible for administrative superin-
tendence, and attorney admission and disciplinary rules, while the Council on Court Pro-
cedure is the major rulemaker in the civil procedure area. See infra text accompanying
notes 191-95.
24. As Professor Wright noted:
Drafting procedural rules is a difficult technical task, best performed by skilled
professionals, rather than by a committee as carefully balanced as were delega-
tions to the 1972 Democratic Convention. But this is true only so long as the rules
are addressed to strictly technical questions of procedure. If rules are going to
have a substantive effect on sensitive issues of social policy, then it does become
important that those who draft the rules represent a cross-section of views on
these policy matters.
Wright, supra note 2, at 656.
25. See Parness, supra note 8, at 1323 ("Arguably, a broad legislative role in
rulemaking diminishes the need for judicial creation of other modes of public participa-
tion, particularly when state legislatures provide a reliable forum for open debate.").
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss1/1
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concern a relatively small number of persons who are exception-
ally affected while other rules do not.2
Notwithstanding these variations, commentators have re-
cently encouraged some consistency in rulemaking methodology
to help ensure efficiency in rulemaking, as well as to promote
openness and accessibility of the rulemaking procedures. Specifi-
cally, proponents of public process judicial rulemaking have
urged that judicial rulemaking procedures be relatively fixed and
made known to the public;27 provide adequate notice and oppor-
tunity to be heard; 8 require that a reasoned basis of final deci-
sion constitute part of the record to be kept;29 and that they
One judicial rulemaker that has only some of its judicial rules reviewed by another
rulemaker is the Ohio Supreme Court. See infra text accompanying notes 146-51.
26. The due process implications of this distinction are reviewed in United States v.
Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 244-45 (1973).
27. E.g., Lesnick, supra note 2, at 580. What Professor Lsnick noted about the
U.S. Judicial Conference is equally true of many other American judicial rulemakers:
In authorizing the Judicial Conference to "carry on a continuous study of the
operation and effect" of the rules and to recommend changes in them to the Su-
preme Court (28 U.S.C. § 331), Congress said nothing about the procedure by
which the conference should carry out the task. Nor has the conference itself seen
fit to publish procedural rules or even an informal statement describing its proce-
dures. What we know about the method by which rules are drafted and considered
comes largely from speeches or articles by judges active in the work of the Judicial
Conference.
Were the conference to state and publish its procedures, it not only would
enhance the awareness of interested persons and thereby facilitate their participa-
tion; it also would find itself required to face explicitly the question whether its
procedures now provide adequate means for obtaining a broad range of input.
Id. It should be noted that the Judicial Conference recently undertook some corrective
action. See Procedures for the Conduct of Business by the Judicial Conference on Rules
of Practice & Procedure, 98 F.R.D. 347 (1983).
28. Again, Professor Lesnick's comments are instructive:
It should be borne in mind that the process of promulgating rules is essentially a
legislative one. To say that is not to assert that it must be carried on only by the
Congress. The point is rather that, just as the legislature has set up procedures
designed to encourage the citizenry to make its views known and to make it more
likely for members of Congress to become aware of varying inputs, so judges and
advisors to judges, when acting in a legislation-writing capacity, should use proce-
dures similarly democratic in their conception.
Lesnick, supra note 2, at 580-81. On the particular means of providing notice and oppor-
tunity, see Parness & Manthey, supra note 16, at 134-39.
29. See Parness & Manthey, supra note 16, at 139-41. One contemporary illustra-
tion of the difficulties that can follow a rulemaker's failure to supply a reasoned basis
involves the federal rule of evidence on the marital communications privilege. See
Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court: A Contemporary Crisis, 27
STAN. L. REv. 673, 683-84 (1975).
1984]
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allow for public initiative.30 While these calls are laudable, they
typically stop short of describing in detail the precise ways that
the suggestions can be implemented. Moreover, when these calls
have been heeded, laws seeking to promote more public process
judicial rulemaking have typically left the judicial rulemaker
with too much discretion to implement a more open and accessi-
ble process."1 It is our hope that the following discussion of
factfinding during judicial rulemaking will spur further efforts to
establish and refine public process judicial rulemaking
procedures.
III. Factfinding During Judicial Rulemaking
To evaluate the propriety of judicial rules, judges are called
upon to perform tasks quite different from those normally per-
formed when they hear a case. The differing tasks usually in-
volve legislative and adjudicative functions.8 2 Judges are not the
only ones who have a duty to distinguish between a legislative
function and an adjudicative function; administrative agencies
must do it all the time.83
30. See Parness & Manthey, supra note 16, at 143-44. While proponents of public
process judicial rulemaking typically rely on common sense and general democratic prin-
ciples, two commentators recently urged that reliance could be premised on the first
amendment right of access. Parness & Copeland, Access to Judicial Rulemaking Proce-
dures, 1982 Aiz. ST. L.J. 641.
31. See, e.g., Spitzer, supra note 2. Spitzer calls the Washington Supreme Court's
issuance of General Rule 9 a "step forward," but still inadequate for it includes only "a
vague reference to public hearings," no commitment on holding hearings for important
or controversial rule changes, no standards concerning when public testimony is appro-
priate, and no comment on when judicial rulemakers should open their deliberations to
public observation. Id. at 63-64. See also Parness & Manthey, supra note 16. The
authors find significant differences in the notices and opportunities for comment prior to
the adoption of various rules by the Ohio Supreme Court. These differences are unre-
lated to either the type of rule involved or the rulemaking authority utilized. Id. at 135-
39.
32. For the nonadjudicative and nonlegislative duties of judges, see Remington, Cir-
cuit Council Reform: A Boat Hook for Judges and Court Administrators, 1981 B.Y.U. L.
REv. 695, 702-03.
33. The Administrative Procedure Act differentiates between "rulemaking" (formal
and informal) and "adjudications." Compare 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982) (rulemaking proce-
dure) with id. § 554 (adjudication procedure). The due process requirements differ for
each proceeding. The dividing line separating rulemaking and adjudicating may not al-
ways be "bright." See United States v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 245
(1973). The task of differentiating between adjudicative and legislative facts in the
agency setting is important because the standards of judicial review vary for the differing
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss1/1
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To perform either a legislative or adjudicative function,
judges must undertake factfinding responsibilities very similar
to those of any agency. Moreover, to make judicial rules, judges
must undertake responsibilities similar to those undertaken by a
legislative body such as the United States Congress, or an Amer-
ican state's general assembly."' So, one would expect to find at
least some similarity between the factfinding process employed
during a trial or by a traditional legislative body and the process
employed by a judicial rulemaker. Unfortunately, such similari-
ties are frequently missing. The judicial rulemaker usually
utilizes inferior factfinding procedures.
Adjudicative facts involve issues of "who did what, where,
how, why, with what motive or intent. 3 5 Legislative facts, on
the other hand, involve general issues "which help the tribunal
decide questions of law and policy and discretion." ' At times, a
legislator must determine an adjudicative fact and an adjudica-
tor must determine a legislative fact. 7 Different considerations
are involved in legislative and adjudicative factfinding,3 s and
types of factual determinations. See FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting,
436 U.S. 775, 813-14 (1978); City of Charlottesville v. FERC, 661 F.2d 945, 957 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
For one influential judge's view on the manner in which agencies should go about
the task of finding both legislative and adjudicative facts, see Estreicher, Pragmatic Jus-
tice: The Contributions of Judge Harold Leventhal to Administrative Law, 80 COLUM.
L. REV. 894, 909-26 (1980).
34. By viewing rulemaking judges as legislators, we take an expansive view of legis-
lation, and thus, we do not limit ourselves to acts of a body whose chief function in
government is to formulate general rules of law that primarily reflect the prevailing so-
cial notions of utility and value. Compare Hazard, The Supreme Court as a Legisature,
64 CORNELL L. Rzv. 1, 2 (1978) (taking a narrow view) with Supreme Ct. of Virginia v.
Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 734 (1980) (taking a more expansive view).
35. K. DAVIs, ADMINSTRATivE LAW TREATISE § 12.3 (2d ed. 1979). At times, adjudica-
tive facts underlying the legislating by federal administrative agencies are characterized
as "specific facts." See, e.g., Association of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151,
1163-64 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied 447 U.S. 921 (1980).
36. K. DAVIS, supra note 35, § 12.3.
37. Legislators are said to be able to distinguish adjudicative facts for they are suffi-
ciently narrow in focus, and sufficiently material to the outcome, so that it is reasonable
and useful for the legislator to resort to a trial-type procedure to resolve them. Associa-
tion of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 627 F.2d at 1164.
38. An early example recognizing the significance of differences between adjudica-
tive and legislative facts in adjudication is found in Davis, An Approach to Problems of
Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HAnv. L. REV. 364, 403-04 (1942) (describing
a category of facts in constitutional cases which assists a court in forming a judgment on
a question of constitutional law). See also Bally Mfg. Corp. v. N.J. Casino Control
11
PACE LAW REVIEW
therefore factfinders should utilize different methods for these
two factual categories. Further differentiation is required be-
cause there are several subcategories of both legislative and ad-
judicative facts. s9 Illustrations of the utilization of different
methods of factfinding for different categories of fact abound in
the area of administrative law.
In their role as adjudicators, judges of American judicial
systems are now being pressed to alter their factfinding proce-
dures when the litigation involves broad policy issues and thus
legislative factfinding.40 In such cases, judges stray from their
role as passive umpires, which is appropriate only for the dis-
pute-resolution form of litigation in which there exists a conflict
on the application of adjudicative facts to the well-understood
and developed law.41 In socially significant cases, judges are said
to have a responsibility for ensuring that all pertinent evidence
is introduced. Thus, the judges are deemed required to en-
courage the participation of those with evidence on and interests
in the broad policy issues even though all participants cannot be
recognized as formal parties to the litigation.'8 In effect, judges
are urged to vary their factfinding procedures for certain litiga-
tion because legislative facts are involved. Similarly, judicial
Comm'n, 85 N.J. 325, 344 n.4, 426 A.2d 1000, 1010 n.4, appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 804
(1981) (Handler, J., concurring).
39. FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. at 813 (judgmental
and predictive facts); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 101 Wis. 2d 90, 127, 303 N.W.2d
639, 656 (1981) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (factual, legal and discretionary findings).
40. See, e.g., Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L.
REV. 1281 (1976); Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term - Foreword: The Forms of Jus-
tice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1979); Shuman, Decisionmaking Under Conditions of Uncer-
tainty, 67 JUDICATURE 326 (1984). For an illustration of altered factfinding procedures,
see Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp. 1322, 1328-29 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
41. See Fiss, supra note 40, at 17. See also Chayes, supra note 40, at 1282-84.
42. See Fiss, supra note 40, at 26 ("It seems almost absurd to rely exclusively on the
initiatives of those persons or agencies who happened to be named plaintiff and defen-
dant. The judge must assume some affirmative responsibility to assure adequate repre-
sentation .... "); Chayes, supra note 40, at 1297 ("The courts, it seems, continue to rely
primarily on the litigants to produce and develop factual materials, but a number of
factors make it impossible to leave the organization of the trial exclusively in their
hands."). See also Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv.
L. REV. 1669 (1975) (encouraging adequate interest representation during the new forms
of administrative agency action); Chayes, The Supreme Court 1981 Term - Foreword:
Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1982) (discouraging
view on the U.S. Supreme Court's continuing failure to distinguish certain socially signif-
icant cases adequately).
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rulemakers are being encouraged to vary their procedures for
factfinding according to the type of factual issue involved.43
The factual issues germane to the advisory committee's rec-
ommendations to change Federal Civil Procedure Rule 11, which
deals with the signing of pleadings, illustrate that both adjudica-
tive and legislative factfinding underlie judicial rulemaking deci-
sions. The notes of the Advisory Committee on rules concerning
the 1983 amendment to Rule 11 state:
Since its original promulgation, Rule 11 has provided for the
striking of pleadings and the imposition of disciplinary sanctions
to check abuses in the signings of pleadings....
Experience shows that in practice Rule 11 has not been effec-
tive in deterring abuses. . . There has been considerable confu-
sion as to (1) the circumstances that should trigger striking a
pleading . . . or taking disciplinary action, (2) the standard of
conduct expected of attorneys who sign pleadings ... and (3) the
range of available and appropriate sanctions. . . . The new lan-
guage is intended to reduce the reluctance of the courts to impose
sanctions ... by emphasizing the responsibilities of the attorney
and reenforcing those obligations by the imposition of sanctions."
When the Advisory Committee discusses the practical "experi-
ence" under Rule 11, it is resolving issues that involve adjudica-
tive facts. Specifically, the Committee found that there were
abuses in the signing of pleadings and that there is confusion
among the members of the federal judiciary and the bar on the
import of Rule 11. When the Committee, as rulemaker, discusses
its aim to reduce the reluctance of judges to impose sanctions, it
is resolving issues akin to legislative facts. Specifically, it found
that federal policy should continue to favor checking abuses in
the signing of pleadings and that this policy would likely be fur-
43. In its discretion, the Washington Supreme Court may hold hearings on proposed
rules; and it will order any approved proposed rule published for comment, though the
court may "invite persons familiar with the rule to provide additional information."
Wash. Sup. Ct. Gen. R. 9.5(b); see also Wash. Sup. Ct. Gen. R. 9.5(a), 9.7(b). The rules
do not elaborate on any guidelines for hearings, the nature of comment, or who may be
invited and under what circumstances. The North Dakota Supreme Court can grant one
petitioning for a rule change, an opportunity for written comment or oral hearing; no
elaboration can be found, however, on the circumstances under which any such comment
or hearings will be requested. See NDRPR, supra note 3, § 3.3.
44. Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 97 F.R.D. 165, 198 (1983)
(citations omitted).
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thered by the adoption of the proposed changes in Rule 11.
The need for varying the factfinding procedures becomes
apparent when one considers who might best assist a Rule 11
rulemaker to stop the abuse of pleadings and remove confusion
at the bar. Regarding the prevalence of abuse and confusion,
presumably all of the judges and lawyers (and perhaps litigants)
involved in cases governed by Rule 11 constitute the group most
able to assess the experience under the rule. Because it would
not be feasible or economical for the committee, in a rulemaking
role, to speak to all (or even most) of that group, the committee
may seek to gauge the group's assessment by a survey, a poll, or
the like. Regarding the desirability of continuing to employ Rule
11 in an effort to deter pleading abuses, those with experience in
regulating attorney conduct and those with experience in educa-
tional programs for attorneys (assuming ignorance is the cause
of some abuse) have something to say about whether a particu-
lar rule of civil procedure is the most effective social means of
altering abusive legal practices.
While judicial rulemakers should be cognizant of their
factfinding duties and the variation in the types of relevant fac-
tual issues, a review of American judicial rulemakers and their
actions reveals that the necessary understanding is not always
present. A clear articulation of the relevant adjudicative and leg-
islative facts is often missing.45 The following examples illustrate
that when the factfinding procedures of judicial rulemakers are
not varied according to the type of factual issues involved, the
accuracy and legitimacy of the factual findings are undermined.
IV. Illustrations of American Judicial Rulemaking Procedures
A. Federal Judicial Rulemaking on Discovery
One set of judicial rulemakers who were particularly sensi-
tive to their factfinding duties were the array of entities involved
in recent federal rulemaking concerning civil discovery. After
briefly identifying the entities responsible for discussing and
proposing civil discovery rule changes, we will examine their re-
45. The following illustrations of American judicial rulemaking activities were cho-
sen because of the variations in the form of judicial rulemaker, judicial rule, and judicial
rulemaking authority (unfettered, fettered or advisory).
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cent conduct.
1. The Rulemakers
Since 1958, federal judicial rulemaking has been accom-
plished through the efforts of several judicial rulemaking bod-
ies. 46 These bodies include the United States Supreme Court,
the United States Judicial Conference, the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts, and the Federal Judicial Center.
Although its role in the rulemaking process has been described
as "largely formalistic," 4 the Supreme Court has broad
rulemaking powers. The Court's powers include the authority to
prescribe trial and appellate rules for civil and criminal ac-
tions;48 amendments to the rules of evidence;49 and admiralty
and bankruptcy rulesY'
A more active federal judicial rulemaker is the U.S. Judicial
Conference, which is charged with the duty of studying and rec-
ommending to the Supreme Court changes in the Court's pre-
scribed rules. 1 Assisting the Conference are various committees
such as the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Proce-
46. For an in-depth look at some judicial rulemaking activities in the late 1930s,
after passage of the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, see Burbank, supra note 11. On the
promulgation of judicial rules prior to the Enabling Act, see 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MU.LER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1002 (1969). On rulemaking between 1939 and 1956,
see id. § 1006. For a discussion of the changes in federal judicial rulemaking in 1958,
which included the establishment of the U.S. Judicial Conference as the primary actor in
the rulemaking process, see The Rule Making Function and the Judicial Conference of
the United States, 21 F.R.D. 117 (1957). For a review of an earlier post 1958 exercise of
federal judicial rulemaking, see Kaplan, Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, 1961-1963 (I), 77 HARV. L. REv. 601 (1964).
47. Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 F.R.D. 521, 521 n.1
(Powell, J., dissenting statement). See also Friedenthal, supra note 29, at 685 (criticizing
the Court for being "a mere conduit for the work of others"); id. at 676 (suggesting the
Supreme Court was "lulled into complacency by Congress' 40 years of acquiescence re-
garding proposed rules").
48. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982) (rules regarding practice and procedure of the dis-
trict courts and courts of appeals in civil actions); 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1982) (rules regard-
ing practice and procedure in criminal cases in district and other courts).
49. 28 U.S.C. § 2076 (1982).
50. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982) (rules of practice and procedure for admiralty and mari-
time cases); 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1982) (rules of practice and procedure in cases under title
11).
51. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1982). Conference recommendations often take the form of pro-
posed new or amended judicial rules.
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dure." While such assistance often proves invaluable to the
Conference, the different advisory committees to the Standing
Committee constitute the core of the federal judicial rulemaking
process. These advisory committees on civil, criminal, admiralty,
bankruptcy, appellate, and evidence rules, are typically the first
federal judicial rulemaker to discuss in-depth proposed rule
changes.
Before discussing the proposed changes, the advisory com-
mittees usually conduct an investigation into the relevant sub-
ject areas of the rules.58 The advisory committees' investigations
are often aided by the work of two federal entities, which are not
traditional judicial rulemakers." The first entity is the Adminis-
trative Office of the United States Courts. It is charged with pre-
paring "statistical data and reports as to the business of the
courts,"55 and with submitting through its director to the Judi-
cial Conference "recommendations" on the operation of the fed-
eral judicial system." The second entity is the Federal Judicial
Center, which is charged with conducting "research and study"
of the operation of federal courts, providing "staff, research,
and planning assistance to the Judicial Conference of the United
States and its committees,"58 and with recommending improve-
ments in "the administration and management of the courts of
the United States.""
52. C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 46, § 1007.
53. For a list of the advisory committee membership, see id. (Supp. 1983).
54. Although not customarily included in discussions of federal judicial rulemakers,
the Director of Administrative Office of U.S. Courts may promulgate rules and regula-
tions approved by the Judicial Conference. See 28 U.S.C. § 604(e) (1982). The Director
of Administrative Office of U.S. Courts may make necessary rules and regulations re-
garding matters such as the use of certified interpreters; the statistical data relating to
the business of the courts; the accommodations for the judicial, clerical and administra-
tive officers of the federal courts; and the establishment of pretrial services in criminal
cases. Id. § 604(f).
55. Id. § 604(a)(2).
56. Id. § 604(a)(3).
57. Id. § 620(b)(1).
58. Id. § 620(b)(4).
59. Id. § 620(b)(2). For a recent description of the Center's research activities, see
Levin, Research in Judicial Administration: The Federal Experience, 26 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
RBv. 237, 243-61 (1981).
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2. The Rulemaking Procedure: Federal Discovery Rules
One advisory committee investigation involved possible civil
rule changes regarding discovery. In an April, 1976 speech on
pretrial civil practice, Chief Justice Burger said that "after more
than 35 years' experience with pretrial procedures, we hear
widespread complaints that they are being misused and over-
used." 0 These complaints led him to request that the United
States Judicial Conference's Standing Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure "conduct hearings on any proposals the
legal profession considers appropriate." '
Sparked by these and other comments,62 the President of
the American Bar Association appointed a Task Force to ensure
that the ideas discussed "would be carefully considered by those
organizations or agencies best able to evaluate and implement
them."" A few months later the Task Force recommended that
the A.B.A. Section on Litigation, in coordination with the
A.B.A.'s Judicial Administration Division, "should accord a high
priority to the problem of abuses in the use of pretrial proce-
dures with a view to appropriate action by state and federal
60. Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D. - A Need for Systematic Anticipation, 70
F.R.D. 83, 95 (1976).
61. Id. at 96.
Sources other than a judicial system's leader can trigger inquiries. For example, the
Chairman of the Iowa Supreme Court's Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure
recently prompted an empirical study of discovery practices in Iowa state courts, in or-
der to prepare a discussion of the application of new federal discovery rules to the lower
court practice. Letter of Professor David S. Walker to Jeffrey A. Parness, (Nov. 3, 1983)
(available in Pace Law Review office).
62. The Chief Justice made his remarks at the National Conference on the Causes
of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice. Other speakers at the Con-
ference voiced similar concerns regarding pretrial discovery practices. See, e.g., Riftkind,
Are We Asking Too Much of Our Courts?, 70 F.R.D. 96 (1976). Riftkind states:
I believe it is fair to say that currently the power for the most massive invasion
into private papers and private information is available to anyone willing to take
the trouble to file a civil complaint. A foreigner watching the discovery proceed-
ings in a civil suit would never suspect that this country has a highly-prized tradi-
tion of privacy enshrined in the fourth amendment.
Id. at 107. See also Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation - Have Good Intentions Gone
Awry?, 70 F.R.D. 199, 203 (1976) (A typical complaint is that a large antitrust suit causes
"massive and unequalled invasion of privacy and business records.").
63. A.B.A., Report of Pound Conference Follow-Up Task Force, 74 F.R.D. 159, 165
(1976).
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courts."64 In addition, it recommended that procedural rules
provide for, and be used to, sanction attorneys who needlessly
extend litigation." The Task Force's recommendations noted
the "paucity of data available for an adequate understanding of
the reasons for the critical problems of judicial administra-
tion."6 Addressing the abuse of the processes of civil discovery,
the Task Force said: "Empirical data concerning the types of
cases in which abuse is most likely to occur, the nature and ex-
tent of the abuse, and the utility of remedies which have been
tried may prove helpful." 7
The Section on Litigation created an ad hoc Special Com-
mittee for the Study of Discovery of Abuse, which began work in
August, 1976.68 The Special Committee solicited input from the
American College of Trial Lawyers, the Federal Judicial Center,
the Conference of Metropolitan Chief Justices, and the Office for
Improvements in the Administration of Justice of the U.S. Jus-
tice Department.6 The Special Committee also solicited input
by circulating a questionnaire published in its newsletter.70 Vari-
64. Id., at 171.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 206. The lack of data was repeatedly noted at the Conference as well. See,
e.g., Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111, 133 (1976); Walsh, Improve-
ments in the Judicial System: A Summary and Overview, 70 F.R.D. 223, 228 (1976)
("As Dr. Nader also pointed out, we don't have the data and the empirical studies to
support many of our instinctive suggestions."). Earlier, Professor Wright had noted:
The sixth, and last, of the limitations on procedural reform is the imperfect state
of our knowledge. We know very little about how present procedures work. We
know even less well what changes might produce improvement in the future. If I
had the power to put into effect tomorrow any change in procedure I thought
desirable . . . I would not know what to recommend to meet future needs. There
is much truth in Professor Hazard's remark that "procedural scholarship is grop-
ing in a fog."
Wright, Procedural Reform: Its Limitations and Its Future, 1 GA. L. REv. 563, 578
(1967) (quoting G. HAZARD, RESEARCH IN CIVM PROCEDURE 3 (1963)).
67. A.B.A., Report of Pound Conference Follow-Up Task Force, 74 F.R.D. at 192.
Even when data is available, it is difficult to read. See Rosenburg & King, Curbing Dis-
covery Abuse in Civil Litigation: Enough is Enough, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REv. 579, 588 (Du-
plicative, cumulative and disproportionate discovery calls for change in discovery rules.);
Flegal & Umin, Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: We're Not There Yet, 1981
B.Y.U. L. REv. 597, 602 (Nub of discovery abuse problem is unnecessarily broad
discovery.).
68. See Spann, Abuse of Discovery: Some Proposed Reforms, 25 N.C. ST. B.Q. 3, 4
(1978).
69. Id.
70. The questionnaire appears in 2 Litigation News, Apr. 1977, at 13. It contains
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ous publications kept the members of the bar informed of the
Special Committee's work and invited their comments.7 1 The
final Special Committee report was published and was circulated
to the bench and bar in late 1977.2
This Special Committee report was considered by the Advi-
sory Committee to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States
in late 1977 and early 1978.71 Most of the report was then circu-
lated to the bench and bar for written comment between March
31 and November 30, 1978. 4 Public hearings were held for two
days in Washington and Los Angeles in October and November
of 1978.75 While comments were being received, the standing
and advisory committees had the additional advantage of a Fed-
eral Judicial Center report on discovery practices that was
"based on a detailed study of more than three thousand cases
selected in six federal district courts. ' '76 This report provided
statistical descriptions of the civil litigation process. The report
was supplemented by the work of statisticians and other profes-
sionals, who designed the data collection and processing instru-
ments, ran the calculations, performed the statistical analyses,
and verified the data. 7 The report specifically dealt with the op-
both objective (Are discovery procedures in federal courts being abused?) and subjective
(Should sanctions be stiffened?) questions. The committee received over 600 responses
to its questionnaire. The results are briefly reviewed in the Progress Report - Special
Discovery Committee, 2 Litigation News, Apr. 1977, at 10.
71. See, e.g., Lundquist & Schechter, The New Relevancy: An End to Trial by
Ordeal, 64 A.B.A. J. 59 (1978) (soliciting input to Special Committee after its first report
was issued).
72. The report is summarized in Cure Proposed for Discovery Abuse, 3 Litigation
News, Jan. 1978, at 1; Lundquist & Schechter, supra note 71; Discovery Reform Pushed
by A.B.A. Committee, 63 A.B.A. J. 1691 (1977). Soon after publication of the final Spe-
cial Committee report, a branch of the United States Justice Department endorsed the
report's proposals. Cure Proposed for Discovery Abuse, supra, at 2.
73. Second Report of the Special Committee for the Study of Discovery Abuse, 5
Litigation News, Apr. 1979, at 9.
74. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 77 F.R.D. 613, 616 (1978) [hereinafter Preliminary Draft] (The March draft
indicated comments and suggestions would be welcomed until July 1, 1978.); see also
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 F.R.D. 524, 539 (1980) [herein-
after Amendments] (indicating that the date for input was extended due to many re-
quests for added time for comment).
75. Amendments, supra note 74, at 539-40.
76. Id. at 540.
77. Connolly, Holleman & Kuhlman, Judicial Controls and the Civil Litigative Pro-
19841
19
PACE LAW REVIEW
eration of the federal rules governing discovery. It covered more
than seven thousand docketed requests appearing in the more
than three thousand terminated cases studied. 78 Prior to com-
pleting the report, these researchers also conducted a telephone
survey of randomly selected attorneys who practiced in the six
courts studied to check the reliability of the case approach.7 9
The final report admittedly did not study "discovery abuse" as
such; its focus was on the quantity rather than the quality of
discovery requests.80 Yet, it did note that its data suggested that
"discovery abuse . . . does not permeate the vast majority of
federal filings"; that, contrary to the common view, federal
judges frequently grant sanctions for discovery abuse; and that
the imposition of "strong judicial controls" would shorten the
time consumed by discovery without impairing discovery
rights."s
At approximately the same time, the Federal Judicial
Center published a survey of the literature on the discovery pro-
cess since the 1970 amendments to the federal civil discovery
rules.82 The survey identified common threads emanating from
the literature as a whole, made a rule-by-rule analysis of the dis-
satisfactions expressed with the discovery rules and of the re-
forms proposed for those rules, and summarized the survey's
findings and conclusions.8" The survey was based on a canvass of
scholarly legal journals, bar association journals and publica-
tions, non-legal journals, books, legislative materials and the
Federal Rules Decisions.84
Finally, during this time the Federal Judicial Center also re-
leased a survey of discovery practices used in the various district
courts.8 The survey was intended to develop an inventory of
cess: Discovery, FED. Jun. CENTER REP., June 1978, at xiii (FJC-R-78-4).
78. Levin, Foreword to id. at xi.
79. Connelly, Holleman & Kuhlman, supra note 77, at 95 app. C.
80. Levin, supra note 78, at xi.
81. Id.
82. Segal, Survey of the Literature on Discovery from 1970 to the Present: Ex-
pressed Dissatisfaction and Proposed Reforms, FED. JUD. CENTER RE., July 1978 (FJC-
R-78-5).
83. Id. at 1.
84. Id. at 2-8.
85. See Guyer, Survey of Local Civil Discovery Procedures, Fed. Jud. Center Staff
Paper (1977) (FJC-SP-77-1).
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discovery procedures.8 6 This survey specified the areas of judi-
cial concern about discovery, as well as the techniques developed
by the judiciary for handling problems with discovery. The
study was not designed to make qualitative evaluations about
the various techniques being utilized.88
All of the above studies were available on request from the
Federal Judicial Center. Also, copies, accompanied by a letter
from the Federal Judicial Center Director soliciting comments
on the studies, were sent to several law professors and to law
libraries.8 The Advisory Committee received comments on the
studies, and on ways in which the factual data contained in the
studies was employed by the Committee in its early formulation
of the proposed rules.90
Although an evaluation of the methodology and the use of
the Federal Judicial Center studies on discovery is beyond the
scope of this Article, it is clear that extensive research was un-
dertaken, that the resulting studies were made available to in-
terested parties and to the judicial rulemakers, and that the
studies and comments were considered by members of the Advi-
sory Committee. There is evidence that certain criticisms of the
research may have influenced the Advisory Committee's final
draft of the proposed amendments.91 Clearly, the A.B.A. Special
Committee report and the Federal Judicial Center studies
served as a significant data base for the Advisory Committee de-
cisions reflected in its drafts of the proposed rule changes.
The first preliminary draft of amendments, issued in
March, 1978, was accompanied by Advisory Committee Notes
and was published in West's Advance Sheets together with a let-
86. See id. at 3-7.
87. See id. at 10-22.
88. Id. at 2.
89. See Letter from A. Leo Levin to Jeffrey A. Parness (Dec. 9, 1978) (available in
Pace Law Review office).
90. See, e.g., Schroeder & Frank, The Proposed Changes in the Discovery Rules,
1978 Anz. ST. L.J. 475; Second Report of the Special Committee for the Study of Dis-
covery Abuse, 5 Litigation News, Apr. 1980, at 9.
91. See Schroeder & Frank, supra note 90, at 475 (ed. note). See also Amendments,
supra note 74, 85 F.R.D. at 540-44. Since this final draft in 1979, further studies on
discovery have occurred, Flegal & Umin, supra note 67, at 600-01, and have prompted
further action by the Advisory Committee and the United States Supreme Court. See,
e.g., Advisory Committee Note to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g) (indicating consideration of new
data regarding discovery abuse).
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ter inviting comments from the bench and bar.9 2 Trade journals
printed synopses of the proposed changes and repeated the
Committee's request for comment.93 This first draft was re-
viewed by the Advisory Committee in light of the written and
oral comments received. The Committee decided to modify some
of its proposals, withdraw others, and continued to recommend
still others. A revised preliminary draft of the proposed rule
changes, accompanied by Advisory Committee Notes responding
to some of the comments previously received, was then circu-
lated for further comment in February, 1979." After a final con-
sideration of all the factual data available, the Advisory Com-
mittee completed a final draft of the proposed amendments,
which was submitted to the Standing Committee.
The Standing Committee reviewed the proposals and made
a few technical changes." More substantially, it deleted a pro-
posed new rule giving a district court judge the authority to no-
tify the Attorney General or other government official of con-
duct by a government representative which the judge considers
improper. This change was based on the Standing Committee's
belief that district court judges already had this authority."'
With the approval of the Advisory Committee Chairman, the
Standing Committee added a paragraph to the Advisory Com-
mittee Notes explaining the district court authority."'
The Standing Committee submitted the revised proposals
to the Judicial Conference, which formally approved them and
submitted them to the Supreme Court. The Court approved the
amended rules, 98 with three justices dissenting.9 The dissent did
not find the rules inherently objectionable, but felt the proposals
fell short of those needed to accomplish sufficient reform in civil
litigation.100 The dissenting justices also noted that the Court
92. Preliminary Draft, supra note 74.
93. See, e.g., Judicial Conference Boosts Discovery Reform, 64 A.B.A. J. 821 (1978);
Actions on Federal Rules, 10 THIRD BRANCH 6 (1978).
94. See Revised Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 80 F.R.D. 323, 326-27 (1980).
95. Amendments, supra note 74, at 538.
96. Id. at 537.
97. Id.
98. Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 F.R.D. 521 (1980).
99. Id. (Powell, J., dissenting statement).
100. Id.
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and the Judicial Conference had relied on the work of the
Standing and Advisory Committees, and that the Court's role in
the rulemaking process was thus largely formalistic.' 1"
Among the more significant factual findings was the Advi-
sory Committee determination that discovery abuse could be
best prevented by court intervention as soon as abuse is
threatened, 10 2 and that this threat arises when opposing attor-
neys are unable to reach agreement on a discovery plan.103 The
Committee considered, and rejected, other means of preventing
abuse, including narrowing the scope of discovery and limiting
the number of questions in interrogatories.' 4 Instead, the Com-
mittee added a new provision on discovery conferences. 08 An-
other major finding was that many interrogated parties exercis-
ing the option of producing business records had abused it.'"
This finding led to a rule change creating new responsibilities for
those exercising that option.10 7 A third major finding involved
abuses under the old rule relating to production of documents
for inspection.0 8 This finding led to a new rule involving respon-
sibilities of parties producing such documents.10 9
At least with this set of rules, it is clear that once the final
set of proposed changes was issued by the Advisory Committee,
most of the factfinding had ended. However, because federal ju-
dicial rulemaking authority is fettered, in that the rules cannot
be adopted without the opportunity for congressional altera-
tion," 0 further factfinding and policymaking were possible after
101. Id. at 521 n.1.
102. Advisory Committee Note to FED. R. Civ. P. 26(0. See also Amendments,
supra note 74, at 526.
103. Advisory Committee Note to FED. R. Civ. P. 26(0.
104. Id.
105. See FED. R. Crv. P. 26(f)(5). See also Amendments, supra, note 74, at 526.
106. Advisory Committee Note to FED. R. Civ. P. 33(c).
107. See FED. R. Civ. P. 33(c). See also Amendments, supra note 74, at 530-31.
108. Advisory Committee Note to FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b).
109. See FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b). See also Amendments, supra note 74, at 532.
110. General rules for civil actions prescribed by the United States Supreme Court
"shall not take effect until they have been reported to Congress ... and until the expi-
ration of ninety days after they have been thus reported." 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982).
A recent example of congressional alteration occurred when Congress amended Rule
4(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Pub. L. No. 97-227, 96 Stat. 246 (1982)
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1982)); Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-462, 96 Stat. 2527 (1982) (codified as amended
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Supreme Court consideration. In this instance, the proposed
changes in the discovery rules were submitted to Congress with
the Advisory Committee comments, and there was no further
detailed inquiry. The changes were forwarded to the House Ju-
diciary Committee by the Chief Justice on May 1, 1980, and
these changes went into effect on August 1, 1980, without signifi-
cant comment or debate on the floor of either federal legislative
chamber."'
B. State Judicial Rulemaking
Judicial Rulemaking in California
Federal judicial rulemaking is not the sole source of exam-
ples for judicial rulemaker sensitivity to factfinding responsibili-
ties. In California, the judicial rulemaking mechanism can be
commended for its judicial rulemakers' factfinding during recent
rulemaking activities. A review of these rulemakers' factfinding
activities follows a brief look at the relevant California rulemak-
ing procedure.
1. The Rulemakers
California's Constitution created the Judicial Council, which
serves a two-fold purpose: it acts as a permanent advisory body
to the courts, the governor and the legislature, and it adopts
rules for court administration, practice and procedure.112 The
Council is composed of the chief justice and one other judge of
at 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1982)). Congressional deference to the courts in procedural rulemak-
ing apparently ended in 1973. See Martin, Inherent Judicial Power: Flexibility Congress
Did Not Write into the Federal Rules of Evidence, 57 TEx. L. REV. 167, 167-68 (1979).
Perhaps congressional review of certain proposed procedural rules may be varied in light
of INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983) (one house veto held unconstitutional).
111. A search of the Congressional Record from April 27 to August 1, 1980, shows no
mention of the federal discovery rules, and a search of Congressional Information Service
evinces no relevant data. See also 38 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2026 (1980). Although some
press groups expressed concerns over the proposed discovery rules, the chairman of the
relevant House Judiciary subcommittee decided not to hold hearings and otherwise re-
fused to block the rules' promulgation. Id. At times, legislative comment regarding pro-
posed rule changes has little to do with the rules themselves. See Nat'l L.J., Aug. 15,
1983, at 4, col. 39 (indicating that 1983 amendments to civil procedure rules took effect
because of House-Senate disagreement on bankruptcy court policy).
112. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6.
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the state supreme court, various lower court judges, members of
the state bar, and a member from each house of the state legisla-
ture. While the chief justice names the judges who serve on the
Council, the State Bar Association's Board of Governors and the
state legislature each choose their own representatives.113 The
composition of the Council and its selection process serves both
to enhance the cooperation between the bar and the Council,
and to strengthen the Council's influence in the legislature, since
a continuous formal liaison between the bodies is assured.1 1 4
The Judicial Council often accomplishes its tasks with the
help of committees. It has divided itself into four standing com-
mittees. The committees are on the appellate courts, superior
courts, municipal and justice courts, and court management.
Each committee is served by a permanent study group." 5 The
Council also appoints ad hoc advisory committees, which may
include non-Council members; these select committees are
designed for more narrowly described special studies that sup-
plement the research projects carried out by the Administrative
Office of the Courts.1 This arrangement permits the Council to
draw on the expertise of the members of the bench, bar and
public, and serves to broaden the base of participation in the
rulemaking process.
In 1960, the Council created the Administrative Office of
the Courts to serve as its staff. An Administrative Director of
Courts is appointed by the Council and given the responsibility
of running the Administrative Office.111 The Administrative Of-
fice carries out the research and pilot programs necessary to im-
plement Council policies, and is responsible for daily court man-
agement. The Office employs a professional staff including
management analysts, statisticians, technicians and lawyers.118
The staff helps "gather and analyze filing and general workload
113. Id.
114. Stolz & Gunn, The California Judicial Council: The Beginnings of an Institu-
tional History, 11 PAC. L.J. 877, 890 (1980); Yakutis, A Half Century of Judicial Coun-
cil - State Bar Cooperation, 52 CAL. ST. B.J. 446 (1977).
115. See Stolz & Gunn, supra note 114, at 880; 1978 JUD. COUNCIL CAL. ANN. REP.
vi-vii (indicating committee membership).
116. Stolz & Gunn, supra note 114, at 880.
117. The Council acted pursuant to the California Constitution. See CAL. CONST.
art. VI, § 6 ("The council may appoint an Administrative Director of the Courts.").
118. Stolz & Gunn, supra note 114, at 881.
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statistics from the trial and appellate courts."' 9 It conducts the
institutes and workshops sponsored by the Council.'" It also
publishes staff findings and recommendations in a Report of the
Administrative Office that is appended to the annual report of
the Judicial Council and which serves as a permanent data base
for later Council decisions. In pursuing its rulemaking responsi-
bilities, the Council often distributes its proposed and adopted
rules to a large number of newspapers, legal publications, and
commercial publishers. Thus, proposed amendments to the
Rules of Court are typically published in the State Bar Journal
with an invitation to comment.
12
'
2. Rulemaking on Appellate Practice in California
In 1969, the Judicial Council undertook a rulemaking pro-
ject that was to result in "the most substantial changes in the
operating procedures of the Courts of Appeals since ...
1905. m122 This project was prompted by statistics compiled by
the Administrative Office from 1961 to 1969, which demon-
strated serious problems with the efficiency of the appellate
court process and the need for reform.123 When it undertook the
project, the Council sought means of increasing the appellate
courts' productivity without adding more judges or another trier
of fact to the court system. 4
At the same time, the Administrative Office conducted its
own research into improving the appellate process, including a
study of appellate procedures in other states. 2 5 In addition, the
Office ran a workshop sponsored by the Council in order to dis-
119. Id. at 881.
120. For a list of the 1969 workshops and institutes conducted, see 1970 JUD. COUN-
CIL CAL. ANN. REP. 59 [hereinafter cited as 1970 ANN. REP.].
121. See, e.g., D. Pugh, C. Korbakes, J. Alfini & C. Grau, Judicial Rulemaking in the
State Courts: A Compendium 20 (1984) (a research project of the American Judicature
Society); Yakutis, supra note 114, at 448.
122. 1970 ANN. REP., supra note 120, at 24 (footnote omitted).
123. Statistics revealed an increase in the number of filings and in the number of
appeals pending per justice, an increase in the number of written opinions, and the com-
mon occurrence of an 18 to 25 month delay between the filing of a notice of appeal and
the filing of an opinion. Id.
124. See id. at 25. It was noted that between 1960 and 1969, the number of appel-
late court justices had risen by 129%. Id. at 24.
125. Id. at 24 n.1.
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cuss possible new operating procedures to meet the caseload cri-
sis.12 6 Clearly, the Council sought at an early stage to hear and
exchange views of those people directly involved in the per-
ceived problems of the appellate process who would be responsi-
ble for implementing any subsequent rule changes. In advance of
the workshop, participants were provided with the Administra-
tive Office study on appellate procedures in other states as well
as the staff's suggestions for improvements in California. 127 Ad-
ditionally, the Administrative Office enlisted for the workshop
speakers from other states to report on the effectiveness of the
suggestions. " The workshop culminated in a "consensus state-
ment" approved by the participants that outlined immediate
and long range steps to be taken to meet the workload problem.
The statement was published as an appendix to the 1970 Annual
Report. 29
In order to implement the workshop recommendations, the
Council proposed several rule revisions. These revisions called
for: (1) adding a substantial number of research attorneys, or-
ganized into a central staff for pre-hearing work; (2) appointing
Administrative Presiding Justices to supervise the research staff
and to perform other administrative duties; and (3) using memo-
randum decisions to dispose of cases that do not present sub-
stantial legal issues.130 These proposed revisions appeared in the
1970 Annual Report, and were submitted to the judges on the
courts of appeal for comment and suggestions. After changes in
light of input, new rules were adopted by the Council in 1970.181
Although the new rules reflected the recommendations of
the majority of appellate judges, later these same judges were
reluctant to confer any substantial duties on the central staff
and unwilling to make use of the memorandum opinions.18"2
Thus, problems with the docket overload and delay continued.
In 1972, a special committee on appellate courts of the State
126. See id. at 59. The theme was "The Crisis in California's Appellate Courts," and
the workshop brought together 35 of the state's 44 justices on the Court of Appeals. Id.
127. Id. at 24 n.1.
128. Stolz & Gunn, supra note 114, at 894.
129. 1970 ANN. REP., supra note 120, at 30.
130. Id. at 24-25.
131. Id. at 27.
132. Stolz & Gunn, supra note 114, at 894.
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Bar Association recommended that an additional court be cre-
ated and inserted between the courts of appeal and the state
supreme court. *It was suggested that this new court review cases
that would be suitable for supreme court consideration. 133 A con-
temporary proposal called for the creation of additional appel-
late courts, with a corresponding increase in the number of
judges.13 The various alternatives were vigorously debated in
newspapers, legal publications and law review articles, 135
prompting the legislature to request a formal study by the Judi-
cial Council.1"
In 1973, the Judicial Council concluded a study that in-
cluded the report of the State Bar Association's Special Com-
mittee, as well as proposals by several appellate court justices.1 7
The Council rejected the Special Committee's recommendations
and opposed any increase in the number of appellate districts.13 8
In short, the Council adhered to its original position and asked
the legislature to authorize a further increase in staff attor-
neys.1"3 Nevertheless, the Council, recognizing the wide differ-
ences of opinion on appellate court reform, recommended that
an in-depth study be made by an impartial expert group.140
The National Center for State Courts subsequently con-
ducted extensive interviews with appellate judges and court per-
sonnel, and collected and analyzed other statistical data on the
California appellate court system. A summary of the Center's re-
port was printed in the 1975 Annual Report of the Judicial
Council, and comments on its recommendations were
133. The Court of Review: A New Court for California, 47 CAL. ST. B.J. 28, 34
(1972); Hufstedler, New Blocks for Old Pyramids: Reshaping the Judicial System, 44 S.
CAL. L. REv. 901 (1971).
134. Stolz & Gunn, supra note 114, at 894.
135. See, e.g., L.A. Metropolitan News, Mar. 30, 1972, at 1, col. 3; Lascher, Lascher
at Large, 47 CAL. ST. B.J. 200 (1972); Janofsky, The State Bar Looks at Appellate Re-
form, 48 CAL. ST. B.J. 367 (1973); Chilton, Appellate Court Reform: The Premature
Scalpel, 48 CAL. ST. B.J. 393 (1973); Leavitt, The Yearly Two Foot Shelf: Suggestions
for Changing Our Reviewing Court Procedures, 4 PAC. L.J. 1 (1973); Hufstedler, Califor-
nia Appellate Court Reform - A Second Look, 4 PAC. L.J. 725 (1973).
136. Stolz & Gunn, supra note 114, at 895.
137. 1973 Jun. CouNcn. CAL. ANN. REP. 13, 19-21.
138. Id. at 21.
139. Id. at 22.
140. Id.
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solicited.14 1
The Council considered the Center's recommendations for a
year, and, in its 1976 Annual Report, published a summary of
the Council's response. 142 While agreeing in principle with the
Center's conclusion "that the appellate courts should carry a di-
rect responsibility to insure prompt completion of the steps nec-
essary before the court can begin review of the case, '14 3 the
Council rejected the Center's recommendation to replace the di-
visional court structure with three-judge panels. In the end, the
Council made only minor rule changes in response to the
Center's study; it retained its original position, stressing the
1969 consensus statement. "
Thus, the 1976 changes in the appellate court rules were
founded on the principles initially adopted by the Judicial
Council in 1970. Although a majority of appellate judges had ap-
proved the 1969 consensus statement, the initial implementation
met with judicial resistance. Yet after several years of further
debate and study, these same judges began to follow the 1970
principles. This step increased efficiency (higher output-per-
judge) and improved the management of the workload with only
a modest increase in the number of judges.4 5
What prompted the change in judicial attitude? Perhaps
the information gathered by further research persuaded the
judges to implement the rules adopted in 1970. Possibly, the
opinions expressed in the various commentaries published after
adoption swayed the judges in favor of implementation. It is also
likely that the judges needed time to acclimate to the changes
and to consider the opinions of their peers. While there is no
definitive answer, it is interesting to note that the consensus
statement was the outgrowth of the Council's two-day workshop
that relied heavily on the early studies done by the Administra-
tive Office. When the Council adopted new rules in 1970, it re-
lied on the consensus statement and the early studies without
soliciting active participation of other groups and without public
141. 1975 JUD. COUNCIL CAL. ANN. REP. 14.
142. 1976 JUD. COUNCIL CAL. ANN. REP. 33 [hereinafter cited as 1976 ANN. REP.].
143. Id.
144. See id. at 36.
145. Stolz & Gunn, supra note 114, at 895.
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input. The judges' willingness to implement the rules came only
after time, further impartial empirical study, and widespread
public debate. Perhaps the experience suggests that public pro-
cess is desirable during judicial rulemaking. In addition, it may
suggest that certain judicial rule changes should be preceded not
only by discussion with those affected, but also by limited exper-
imentation with the proposed changes prior to any across-the-
board change.
Inconsistent Judicial Rulemaking in Ohio
A more comprehensive review of rulemaking activities in a
particular jurisdiction can reveal inconsistencies in a judicial
rulemaker's procedures as well as differences in sensitivity to
factfinding duties from one instance of rulemaking to another.
Ohio is one such jurisdiction.
1. The Rulemakers
In 1968, voters in Ohio approved constitutional amend-
ments granting their supreme court the power to promulgate
rules governing superintendence over all state courts,'" the
practice and procedure in all state courts,147 the admission to the
practice of law,14 and the discipline of persons admitted to law
practice. 49 There is an important difference between the rules of
superintendence, admission and discipline, and the rules of prac-
tice and procedure: the rules of practice and procedure must be
submitted for review and possible veto to the state legislature
before becoming effective. 50 Thus, the rules of practice and pro-
cedure are examples of fettered rulemaking, while the superin-
tendence, admission and discipline rules are examples of unfet-
tered judicial rulemaking power. The difference in rulemaking
authority suggests that there might be differences in the
rulemaking mechanisms employed by Ohio's judicial rulemakers.
146. OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(A)(1).
147. Id. § 5(B).
148. Id. § 5(C).
149. Id.
150. Id. § 5(B) (Rules take effect unless general assembly adopts a concurrent reso-
lution of disapproval.). At times, legislative approval is not easily obtained by the court.
Parness & Manthey, supra note 2, at 262-66.
[Vol. 5:1
30https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss1/1
JUDICIAL RULEMAKING
However, while some differences in rulemaking mechanisms can
be found, there is no consistent policy regarding the process of
judicial rulemaking in Ohio.151
2. The Rulemaking Procedure: Rules of Civil Procedure
Inconsistency in rulemaking procedures is exemplified by
reviewing some changes in the civil procedure rules. In May,
1968, shortly after passage of the constitutional amendment, the
Ohio Supreme Court began its effort to promulgate new Ohio
Rules of Civil Procedure. 152 First, the court appointed an ad hoc
Rules Advisory Committee, consisting of thirty-eight lawyers
and judges and a small staff of law professors. 15 The Committee
separated into twelve subcommittees, each considering various
blocks of rules and each using the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure as a guide.I The Committee prepared a proposal, which
was submitted to the Ohio Supreme Court late in December,
1968.155 Then, the court began a series of conferences with the
Committee staff to review each rule individually. Members of
the Committee also appeared at many bar association meetings
to review and discuss the proposed rules.15 Publication of the
draft rules in the journal of the Ohio State Bar Association, ac-
companied by a request for comments, began in November,
1968, and was completed by March, 1969.157 Before submission
of the rules to the legislature, a joint House and Senate select
committee, consisting of three members from each chamber, as-
151. For an in-depth review of Ohio judicial rulemaking, see Parness & Manthey,
supra note 2.
152. See Corrigan, A Look at the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, 43 OHIo B. 727, 728
(1970).
153. The committee began its work in the summer of 1968. Harper, Ohio Rules of
Civil Procedure: A Symposium, 39 U. CIN. L. Rav. 465, 468 (1970).
154. Corrigan, supra note 152, at 728. Because of the differences between the Ohio
and federal court systems, the committee felt it was impractical to adopt the federal
rules verbatim. Id. The committee members made the initial decisions about adopting
the federal rules without public input. The committee's staff notes, which consist of the
views of certain committee staff members, compare the provisions of the new rules with
the former Ohio statutes and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, thus providing a
record for its decisions.
155. Harper, supra note 153, at 469.
156. Id. at 469-70.
157. See 41 OHIo B. 1399-1412, 1525-49 (1968); 42 OHIO B. 89-106, 223-43, 339-55
(1969).
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sembled and began to review the rules. The Joint Committee's
meetings were open to the public, and again, the state bar jour-
nal invited comments from interested persons. 58 The Ohio Su-
preme Court, in response to public comment, revised the rules
and submitted them along with the Rules Advisory Committee's
notes to the clerks of both houses of the Ohio legislature prior to
January 15, 1970, a date mandated by the 1968 constitutional
amendments. "' These revised rules, along with an invitation for
further public comment, appeared in the state bar journal in in-
stallments beginning in the October 6, 1969 issue. 60 Since the
revised rules were published in installments, Rules 38-86 ap-
peared only one day before their submission to the legislature.161
Nevertheless, the supreme court considered and accepted fur-
ther suggestions after submission. Almost two years after the
Rules Advisory Committee began its work, the final draft of the
rules of civil procedure was adopted when the legislature chose
not to exercise its veto power. 62
3. The Rulemaking Procedure: Rules of Evidence
A somewhat different process was used by the court in
drafting Ohio's Rules of Evidence. An ad hoc Evidence Rules
Advisory Committee and staff, composed of members of the
bench, bar, and law professors was appointed by the court in
June, 1975.163 Four subcommittees were formed; each subcom-
mittee handled a group of rules and each used the federal rules
158. See 42 OHIO B. 1321 (1969).
159. Pursuant to OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B), proposed rules of practice and proce-
dure are to be filed by the Supreme Court with the General Assembly not later than
January 15th, and are to take effect on July 1st unless the Assembly adopts a concurrent
resolution of disapproval.
160. See 42 OHIo B. 1201-17, 1243-58, 1415-43 (1969); 43 OHIO B. 21-51 (1970).
161. 43 OHIO B. 21-51 (1970). See Corrigan, supra note 152, at 729 (indicating sub-
mission occurred on January 13, 1970).
162. Since 1970, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee has been dissolved, with the
maintenance of the rules (receipt and transmission of comments, etc.), chiefly the re-
sponsibility of a staff advisor on procedural rules. See Letter to Jeffrey A. Parness from
David S. Hay, Staff Advisor on Procedural Rules (June 7, 1978); Letter to Jeffrey A.
Parness from Professor Stanley E. Harper, Jr. (July 18, 1978) (copies on file with Prof.
Parness).
163. O'Neill, Symposium: The Ohio Rules of Evidence, 6 CAP. U.L. REV. 515, 515-16
(1977); but see Blackmore, The Ohio Evidence Rules: 105 Years of Heritage and Di-
lemma, 6 CAP. U.L. REV. 533, 540 n.47 (1977) (indicating May 20th appointment).
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as its model.1" The publication of the proposed evidence rules
differed from the installment publication of the rules of civil
procedure. Without prior publication, the Committee submitted
the completed draft of the suggested evidence rules to the Ohio
Supreme Court accompanied by only the oral commentary of
staff members. 160 The court reviewed the rules, made revisions,
and published the revised rules without explanatory material. It
did request public comment. 6 The court held hearings on the
proposed rules in November, 1976, and approved the final draft
early in December.' 67 The rules of evidence were formally sub-
mitted to the legislature on January 12, 1977.6g Following a pro-
cedure similar to the one that produced the civil rules, the legis-
lature formed a six-member joint subcommittee to study the
rules of evidence." 9 Again, the subcommittee held public hear-
ings.17 0 However, the only people who testified before the Com-
mittee during the three weeks of hearings were a representative
of the Attorney General, who opposed adoption of the rules, and
members of the Evidence Rules Advisory Committee.17 1
The General Assembly concurred with the Attorney Gen-
eral; it rejected the proposed rules of evidence in June, 1977.172
Commentators attributed the rejection, in part, to a belief that
there was not enough time for adequate legislative consideration
of the rules between the January 12 submittal date and the July
1 effective date prescribed by Ohio's Constitution.17 3 Another
164. Miller, The Game Plan: Drafting the Ohio Rules of Evidence, 6 CAP. U.L. Rzv.
549, 552-53 (1977).
165. Id. at 554.
166. Id.; 49 OHIO B. 929 (1976).
167. Blackmore, supra note 163, at 540. At least one of the members of the Advisory
Committee is unsure of precisely when the Supreme Court acted. Miller, supra note 164,
at 554 n.8.
168. See O'Neill, supra note 163, at 516.
169. See Walinski & Abramoff, The Proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence: The Case
Against, 28 CAsE W. REs. 344, 348 n.21 (1978).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See id. at 348-49, 349 n.25.
173. Id. at 349. More time may be needed for legislative review of evidence rules
than for civil procedure rules due to the persistent uncertainty as to whether the term
"practice and procedure," OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B), encompasses evidence. See, e.g.,
409 U.S. 1132-33 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Mo. CONSr. art. V, § 5 (rules of practice
and procedure explicitly said to exclude law relating to evidence). In addition, more time
may also be required because of greater public interest in evidence rules, as compared to
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significant reason for the rejection was that the evidence rules
were not accompanied by the Evidence Rules Advisory Commit-
tee's notes. A legislative subcommittee noted in its report that
since the proposed rules contained broad, general principles, the
Advisory Committee's research and analysis would have been
helpful in determining the impact of the proposed rules on ex-
isting Ohio laws."' On January 12, 1978, the court resubmitted
the proposed evidence rules, again without any Advisory Com-
mittee commentary.7 7 The General Assembly established an-
other special subcommittee to study the law of evidence in Ohio
and to report its findings by December 31, 1978.176 By resubmit-
ting the rules, the court forced the legislature to act by July 1,
1978 - six months before the deadline the legislature set for its
own subcommittee's review. Again, time constraints as well as
the lack of factual data and a written rationale helped to defeat
the supreme court's proposals. This time, the General Assembly
said the rules were not approved because the high court lacked
constitutional authority to adopt rules of evidence. Moreover,
the legislature did not find a sufficient need for new rules of
evidence.17 7
Perhaps the proposed rules would have fared better on
resubmission if the Advisory Committee had attempted to alle-
viate the legislature's concerns. The need for evidence rules
might have been demonstrated by circulating the results of re-
search surveys indicating a perception of problems with the ex-
isting evidence law and a need for dramatic revision. Further-
more, the desirability of certain rules might have been better
demonstrated if analogies were drawn to other jurisdictions with
similar evidentiary provisions' 78 and if studies were conveyed
rules of civil procedure. See Blakely, A Short Introduction to the Ohio Rules of Evi-
dence, 10 CAP. U.L. REv. 237, 250-51 (1980). See also 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072, 2076 (1982)
(indicating the differences in congressional review of the amendments to Rules of Civil
Procedure and Rules of Evidence).
174. See Walinski & Abranoff, supra note 169, at 350.
175. Id. at 349 n.25.
176. Id.
177. Giannelli, The Proposed Rules of Evidence: The General Assembly, Evidence
and Rulemaking, 29 CAsE W. Rs. 16, 20 (1978).
178. The Federal Rules of Evidence were slightly more than a year and a half old
when the proposed rules of evidence were first submitted to the joint subcommittee of
the General Assembly. The subcommittee pointed out that there was not much case law
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demonstrating that a majority of the bench and bar favored the
proposals. At the very least, the Advisory Committee could have
explained its rationale for proposing the set of rules by including
its own record of the deliberations with its proposals."7 9
4. The Rulemaking Procedure: Rules of Superintendence
In contrast to the varying sets of rules of practice and pro-
cedure, Ohio's judicial rules of superintendence become effective
without legislative review, upon adoption by the supreme court.
When promulgating these rules, the court often employs a pro-
cess different than that used for proposing rules of practice and
procedure. Thus, rules of superintendence are often drafted by
the high court's administrative staff,180 a more permanent body
than the ad hoc committees established for certain practice and
procedure rules. Public comment on published, proposed
amendments to the Municipal and County Court Rules, one set
of superintendence rules, are often directed to the court's ad-
ministrative director.' The final commentary accompanying
new superintendence rules and amendments are often written by
members of the court's staff.8 2 Unlike the rules of civil proce-
dure and the rules of evidence, the Ohio Supreme Court pub-
lished its first set of superintendence rules, the Rules of Super-
intendence, only after they became effective. Nevertheless,
proposed changes to these rules are often published in the state
journal prior to adoption. 83
under the Federal Rules of Evidence. It questioned whether bench and bar were pre-
pared to operate under rules that contained a different language and judicial philosophy.
Walinski & Abramoff, supra note 169, at 354-55.
179. The Ohio Rules of Evidence went into effect on July 1, 1980, only after Staff
Notes had been prepared and after some rules were further modified to differentiate the
Ohio law from the federal law. Blakely, supra note 173, at 242, 247.
180. See Parness & Manthey, supra note 2, at 264.
181. See, e.g., 51 OHio B. 815 (1978).
182. See, e.g., 8 OHio REv. CODE ANN. 5 (Baldwin 1971) (Preface to Rules of Super-
intendence for Municipal Courts and County Courts).
183. See Parness & Manthey, supra note 2, at 265. In contrast, the second set of
superintendence rules, dealing with municipal and county courts, were published over a
year before their effective date. Id. More recently, Ohio Supreme Court rulemaking in
the area of judicial conduct, which also occurs without legislative review, was criticized
for lack of public notice and opportunity for public input. See 56 OHio B. 160 (1983). See
also Letter from Albert L. Bell, Counsel of the Ohio State Bar Association, to Jeffrey A.
Parness (Aug. 10, 1983) (available in Pace Law Review office) (indicating no notice to
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5. The Rulemaking Procedure: Traffic Rules
The mechanism for revising Ohio's traffic rules, which are
apparently promulgated by the supreme court pursuant to stat-
ute,184 present yet another variation. The traffic rules are the
only rules which have a standing commission that reviews the
rules every year. This review commission, created by the su-
preme court, has between five and eleven members; all members
serve for three-year terms, and at least some members must be
chosen from the ranks of specified judicial and police officers.185
Although persons are free to express their interest in serving on
the Commission, there appears to be no formal procedure for
selecting the Commission's membership. 186 The Commission
considers "[a]ll comments and suggestions concerning the appli-
cation, administration and amendment ' 187 of the traffic rules,
and submits its recommendations to the supreme court. 8' Once
drafted, the proposed traffic rules are generally published before
their effective date, but without requests for comment.18 9
Amendments to the traffic rules have been published as they be-
come effective, with no advance notice. 90
From our review, it is clear that there is no consistent policy
regarding the exercise of judicial rulemaking authority in Ohio.
Some rule changes are drafted by diverse panels of experts with
input permitted from all sectors of the public prior to court
adoption, while others are formulated in relative obscurity by
small groups. Some rules are subjected to ongoing review by per-
manent advisory bodies, while others are studied sporadically by
ad hoc groups. Presently, most proposed rule changes are pub-
lished only in the state bar journal. Although a uniform court
state bar association or others prior to the court's promulgation of changes to the Su-
preme Court Rules for the Government of the Bar of Ohio).
184. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2935.17, 2937.46 (Page 1982). See also OHIo REV.
CODE ANN. § 2935.17 (Page 1982).
185. OHIo TRAP. R. 22(B) (Anderson 1983).
186. Telephone conversation between Jeffrey A. Parness and Coit H. Gilbert, Ad-
ministrative Director, Ohio Supreme Court (Apr. 18, 1979) (phone call made in response
to Letter from Jeffrey A. Parness to Coit H. Gilbert (Apr. 13, 1979) (letter available in
Pace Law Review office)).
187. OHIo TRAF. R. 22(A) (Anderson 1983).
188. Id. 22(C).
189. See, e.g., 47 Onio B. 885 (1974).
190. See, e.g., id. at 1499.
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policy is not necessarily desirable, differences in policy should be
geared to the type of rule and rulemaking authority. Since the
Supreme Court of Ohio has failed to establish consistent
rulemaking procedures, or to undertake particular judicial
rulemaking activities in any consistent way, the process is inac-
cessible and often forecloses the receipt of information pertinent
to the factual issues underlying judicial rules.
Statutory Restraints on Judicial Rulemaking in Oregon
One way to curb unnecessary variations in any judicial
rulemaker's factfinding procedure is to legislate the manner in
which that rulemaker must engage in rule inquiries. Oregon pro-
vides but one example of a jurisdiction where a judicial
rulemaker must follow statutory procedures during certain
rulemaking deliberations.
1. The Rulemakers
In Oregon, the power to make judicial rules is primarily
vested in the state legislature. That body, however, has dele-
gated much of its power. Statutes provide that the chief justice
of the state's highest court has general administrative authority
over the courts of the state, and may make rules and orders con-
sonant with this authority.191 In addition to its general adminis-
trative authority, the Oregon Supreme Court possesses the
power to adopt rules for civil and criminal proceedings regarding
the form of written process, notices, motions and pleadings,19 2
and the power to make rules to coordinate class actions. 9 This
unfettered rulemaking power is, however, specifically limited to
rules of superintendence; the court is denied the power to make
rules of civil or criminal procedure. 1" Finally, the court has the
statutory authority to approve rules of procedure on the admis-
191. See OR. Rzv. STAT. § 1.002(1) (1983) (recognizing the court as "the highest ju-
dicial tribunal of the judicial department," but leaving the chief justice with responsibil-
ity for exercising "administrative authority and supervision" over state courts).
192. See OR. Rzv. STAT. § 1.006 (1983).
193. See id. § 1.004.
194. Such a limitation seemingly springs from OR. REv. STAT. § 1.735 (1981), al-
though the limitation seems less clear since the law was amended. See id. § 1.002(1).
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sion and discipline of members of the bar. 195 Rules of superin-
tendence and bar admission and discipline, promulgated by the
court pursuant to these statutory bases, are not subject to subse-
quent legislative review.
2. The Rulemaking Procedure: Rules of Civil Procedure
Prior to 1977, the Oregon legislature exercised the power to
adopt rules of civil procedure. However, members of the bench
and bar often called for reform of both the rules themselves and
the process by which the rules were made. 96 Thus in 1977, the
legislature created the Council on Court Procedure, a permanent
rulemaking body charged with reviewing the civil procedure
laws, studying proposals concerning civil procedure advanced by
interested persons, and promulgating rules governing pleading,
practice and procedure. 197 Unlike the unfettered rulemaking au-
thority vested in the supreme court for matters of superinten-
dence, the rules adopted by the Council must be submitted to
the legislature for review.9 "
The Council is composed of a supreme court judge, an ap-
pellate court judge, six circuit court judges, two district court
judges, twelve lawyers and one public member. 19 In addition to
being subject to Oregon "sunshine laws," the Council must hold
at least one public hearing in each of the state's congressional
districts on an annual basis.200 Furthermore, the Council must
notify all members of the state bar of any meeting at which final
action is expected to be taken on the promulgation, modification
195. See id. §§ 9.005(6), 9.490 (indicating court approves rules on these matters
adopted by the board of governors of the bar).
196. See Kirkpatrick, Procedural Reform in Oregon, 56 OR. L. REv. 539, 540 (1977).
197. For background on the legislative creation of the Council, see Kirkpatrick,
supra note 196, at 563-67.
198. OR. REv. STAT. § 1.735 (1983) provides:
The rules thus adopted and any amendments. . . shall be submitted to the Legis-
lative Assembly at the beginning of each regular session and shall go into effect on
January 1 following the close of that session unless the Legislative Assembly shall
provide an earlier effective date. The Legislative Assembly may, by statute,
amend, repeal or supplement any of the rules.
199. Id. § 1.730(1). The judges are selected by members of their respective courts, or
by a judge's association; the lawyers are appointed by the state bar board of governors,
pursuant to OR. REv. STAT. § 1.730(1)(e) (1983); and the public member is selected by
the Oregon Supreme Court. Id.
200. Id. § 1.740(2).
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or repeal of a rule. This notice must be published or distributed
at least two weeks prior to a meeting and must include the time,
place and agenda of the meeting. 01 Finally, the Council must
make a copy of its proposals available to anyone on request. 202
Soon after the legislation creating the Council was passed,
members were appointed and meetings began. By December,
1977, the Council published a schedule of its regular meeting
times and places.203 To supplement these public hearings, the
Council invited the public to submit written and oral comments
at its regular meetings.?° The Council divided into subcommit-
tees in the areas of pleading, discovery, process and trial proce-
dure.20 5 The input from the public hearings was considered and
debated among the Council members, and as a result, a number
of tentative decisions were published in the spring of 1978.206 At
that time the Council also requested further public comment.07
By October, 1978, the Council had prepared a tentative
draft of new rules of civil procedure, and a summary of some of
the proposed rules appeared in the state bar journal.2 08 The full
text of the proposals was published in the Oregon Appellate
Courts' Advance Sheets and in material distributed by the Bar's
Continuing Legal Education Committee. In compliance with the
statute, the Council made full texts available to any interested
person on request. A public hearing was held on November 3,
1978, for oral comment on the Council's proposals. Notice of the
meeting, including the time, place and a description of the
agenda, was published along with further requests for written
comments. 0 9 Notice of the December 2, 1978 meeting, at which
the Council contemplated taking final action on the proposals,
was published a month before the meeting was held. When the
proposed new rules were adopted, they were submitted to the
201. Id. § 1.740(3)(b).
202. Id. § 1.740(3)(c).
203. See 38 OR. ST. B. BuLL., Dec. 1977, at 12.
204. Id.
205. 38 OR. ST. B. BULL., May 1978, at 11.
206. See id.
207. Id. at 12.
208. See 39 OR. ST. B. BULL., Oct. 1978, at 32-36.
209. Id. at 33. Notice of the meeting was published one month before the meeting
was actually held.
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legislature for approval.2 10 A joint committee considered the
rules over a three-month period, and made changes before the
rules became effective on January 1, 1980.21 While the rules
were being considered by Oregon's Legislative Assembly, a sum-
mary of the portions most significant to Oregon lawyers ap-
peared in the state bar journal. 2
Autonomy and Judicial Rulemaking in Oklahoma
In the absence of any statute or rule mandating a procedure
for rulemaking, the judicial rulemaker is free to employ
whatever methods it deems fit. A rather extreme example of how
such unbridled discretion can lead to very poor factfinding, and
perhaps poor rules, is found in the Oklahoma Supreme Court's
rulemaking in the area of attorney advertising.
For many years the Oklahoma Supreme Court has exercised
judicial rulemaking authority in the area of attorney professional
responsibility.212 In 1969, the Oklahoma Supreme Court insti-
tuted a Code of Professional Responsibility, which was based on
the American Bar Association's model code.21 In June, 1977, the
decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona21 5 effectively voided the provision in the Oklahoma
Code of Professional Responsibility barring lawyer advertis-
ing.216 Two months later, the Board of Governors of the
Oklahoma Bar Association appointed a special committee to
draft suggested changes in the Code in accord with Bates.2 "
About four months after Bates was decided, the Oklahoma Su-
210. Comment, Civil Procedure, 16 WHLAmETrE L.J. 703, 704 (1980).
211. Id. at 704.
212. See Forum vol. 1, No. 7, insert to 39 OR. ST. B. BULL., June 1979.
213. See generally Archer v. Ogden, 600 P.2d 1223 (Okla. 1979); Ford v. Board of
Tax-Roll Corrections, 431 P.2d 423 (Okla. 1967); In re Integration of State Bar, 185
Okla. 505, 95 P.2d 113 (1939).
214. Helman, supra note 2, at 509 n.2.
215. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
216. Although undermined by the decision in Bates, the Oklahoma Bar Associa-
tion's president attempted to continue the total ban on lawyer advertising while the
Oklahoma Code was being changed. See 48 OKLA. B.A. J. 1619 (1977). OBA's president
advised Oklahoma lawyers that Bates "is not final and does not... change the Code of
Professional Responsibility in Oklahoma which still prohibits advertising by lawyers."
Id.
217. Hellman, supra note 2, at 517.
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preme Court had before it the Board of Governors' proposed
amendments to the section of the Code dealing with lawyer ad-
vertising. Very little information on the process by which the
Board of Governors and its committee adopted these proposals
filtered to either the bar association's membership or the
public.2 18
When the high court received these proposals, it acted
quickly in what has been described as a "highly secretive"
way. 19 Shortly after a meeting between "members of the
Oklahoma Supreme Court and an uncertain number of officers
and governors of the Oklahoma Bar Association," which was not
open to the public, 220 the court issued an order in January, 1978.
This order outlined revisions in the Code's provisions on lawyer
advertising along the lines recommended by the Board of Gover-
nors and its special committee.2 1
Oklahoma revised its rules on lawyer advertising at a time
when there was a high level of professional and public interest in
the topic of lawyer advertising. While other state high courts
were promulgating judicial rule changes concerning lawyer ad-
vertising only after extensive professional and public debate,
Oklahoma adopted its rules with virtually no public process."
V. Hearings on the Factual Premises Underlying Judicial
Rules
Our review of the different judicial rulemaking procedures
demonstrates the prevalence of adjudicative and legislative facts
during rulemaking deliberations. It illustrates the failure of cer-
tain judicial rulemakers to recognize the existence of significant
218. See id. at 517-18.
219. Id. at 522.
220. Id. at 519. The meeting was not announced to the public and the discussion
was not recorded. Id.
221. The Board sought to restrict lawyer advertising whenever possible. Although
the court allowed telephone directory page advertising notwithstanding the Board's call
for disallowance, the court's rules restricted lawyer advertising to print media, as did the
Board's proposal. See id. at 519 nn.67-68.
222. See id. at 522 n.86 and accompanying text.
223. Id. at 522. Other state courts have used similar procedures. See Blackmar, The
Missouri Supreme Court and Lawyer Advertising: RMJ and Its Aftermath, 47 Mo. L.
REv. 621, 629-32 (1982) (Missouri court's committee report not preceded by public hear-
ings and not circulated before or after court consideration).
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factual issues during rulemaking deliberations. Moreover, it il-
lustrates that some judicial rulemakers do not differentiate ade-
quately between the types of factual issues if recognition does
occur. In order to minimize these failures, rules or statutes are
needed to govern the manner in which judicial rulemakers oper-
ate. The statutes should mandate that judicial rulemaking pro-
cedures provide for hearings on the adjudicative and legislative
facts underlying the judicial rules under consideration. These
hearings should not resemble the hearings conducted during liti-
gation, because factual issues in rulemaking are quite different
from factual issues in litigation.
As noted earlier, adjudicative facts in both litigation and in
judicial rulemaking involve issues of "who did what, where, how,
why, with what motive or intent. 2 2 4 Although the "who" in liti-
gation typically refers to only a few groups, including but not
limited to the parties, the "who" in rulemaking typically in-
volves a larger number of individuals and groups. Thus, while
considering whether to impose a sanction under a civil pleading
rule during litigation, a judicial officer often must resolve issues
such as: who actually signed and filed the allegedly deficient
pleading; how is the pleading deficient; what were the circum-
stances when the pleading came to be filed; and what were the
purposes behind the particular filing. While considering possible
changes in a court's authority to issue sanctions for civil plead-
ing rule violations, a judicial rulemaker often must resolve issues
such as: who may, and who usually does, file civil pleadings in
that court; what types of deficiencies do civil pleadings typically
include; and what are the circumstances in which deficient
pleadings are filed. The adjudicative facts found by a judicial
rulemaker who confronts pleading abuse are broader than the
facts found by a judge during the course of litigation. Thus, the
nature of adjudicative facts changes from the litigation to the
rulemaking context.
In the rulemaking context, it is necessary to go beyond the
singular occurrence before the court. For instance, information
regarding facts about the abuse of pleadings in a judicial
rulemaking context requires both observation and analysis of a
large number of proceedings, rather than simply observing or
224. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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participating in a single occurrence. These observations and
analyses are rarely done as the proceedings accumulate. Unlike
the judge, who has the information necessary to find an issue
before him during most forms of litigation,25 a judicial
rulemaker must often commission a study to find adjudicative
facts. 226 A judicial rulemaker can commission consultants or gov-
ernmental officers to observe and analyze relevant occurrences
as they occur or after they happen. For example, the Federal
Judicial Center developed information on discovery practices
during recent federal judicial rulemaking on discovery. Simi-
larly, the National Center for State Courts studied appellate
practice during the California Judicial Council's consideration of
judicial rules on appellate court practice.
The determination of adjudicative facts underlies the adop-
tion of many of the judicial rules which were discussed in Part
IV. Opinions about adjudicative facts often instigate judicial
rulemaking activity. The recent changes in the federal discovery
rules were first triggered by individual perceptions of misuse and
overuse of pretrial procedures.2 7 The changes in California ap-
pellate court practice were initiated after publication of statis-
tics showing increasing appellate court caseloads..2 " The study of
civil procedural rules in Ohio began with the premise that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had worked so well that they
merited strong consideration in Ohio.2 29
225. Contra Davis, Facts in Lawmaking, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 931, 937-38 (1980);
Lermack, No Right Number? Social Science Research and the Jury-Size Cases, 54
N.Y.U. L. REv. 951, 973-74 (1979) (suggesting that judges in litigation may sometimes be
aided by collaborating with social scientists on studies related to issues in their cases).
See Price Bros. Co. v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 629 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1980) (judge's
impartiality may have been compromised by his law clerk's visit to and report on a mal-
functioning machine, then the subject of a bench trial).
226. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
228. See supra note 123.
229. See supra note 154 and accompanying text. See also Harper, supra note 153, at
468 (indicating Chief Justice Taft requested the rules advisory committee to use the
federal rules as a guide).
Findings of adjudicative facts underlie many of the other rule changes we have dis-
cussed. The federal judicial rulemakers' decision not to alter the provisions on the gen-
eral scope to discovery was founded, in part, on the inability to identify and clearly de-
fine discovery abuse problems. Yet, the rules regarding the production of documents
were altered due to findings of certain types of abuse. See Amendments, supra note 74,
at 542. The Oregon Council on Court Procedures must have decided to maintain code or
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In contrast to adjudicative facts involving who, what, where,
why and how, legislative facts involve issues of "law, policy and
discretion. ' '2 80 Legislative facts are relevant in both litigation
and judicial rulemaking. In the litigation context, issues of law,
policy, and discretion are usually determined so that application
can be made to the parties and others directly involved in the
dispute being litigated.813 By contrast, in the judicial rulemaking
context, legislative determinations of issues of law, policy, and
discretion are typically decided so that guidelines can be estab-
lished for future conduct. Moreover, during judicial rulemaking
the parties who are to be guided by a new judicial rule are not
necessarily before the judicial rulemaker to provide insights that
help resolve the issues.
Underlying the judicial rules discussed in Part IV are three
different forms of legislative facts: current legal facts, discretion-
ary judgments, and policy judgments. For example, federal judi-
cial rulemakers determined during their recent revisions of the
discovery rules that federal trial judges possess the authority to
notify the Attorney General, or other government officers, of im-
proper conduct by a government representative. 23 2 This determi-
nation is one form of legislative fact that is perhaps best charac-
terized as a "current legal fact."
The federal rulemakers' determination that the adoption of
the revisions to the discovery rules do not "fall short of those
needed to accomplish reforms in civil litigation that are long
overdue" 238  illustrates the discretionary judgment of the
rulemakers. It involves a decision about how far the law should
fact pleading in civil cases, and not to adopt notice pleading, in part, because the rigid
pleading rules in Oregon had not been found to deter the filing of meritorious claims in
the Oregon trial courts. See 38 OR. ST. B. BULL. 11, May 1978; 39 OR. ST. B. BuLL. 1-2,
Dec. 1979. Finally, the Oklahoma Supreme Court must have determined that any evils
arising out of lawyer advertising in display ads in the classified sections of telephone
directories were no different than the evils arising from other forms of permissible print
ads, although the bar's Board of Governors disagreed. See Hellman, supra note 2, at 519.
230. K. DAvis, supra note 35, at § 12.3.
231. Occasionally, determinations of issues of law, policy and discretion are held to
apply prospectively. Of course, courts sometimes employ "dicta" to signal how law, pol-
icy and discretion will be applied in future litigation.
232. See supra text accompanying note 96.
233. Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 F.R.D. 521 (1980)
(Powell, J., dissenting statement).
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go to carry out the policy underlying the new law. 34 Discretion-
ary judgments usually involve choices among several alternate
ways a certain policy could be furthered. For example, discovery
abuse could be rectified by criminal sanction, civil liability, or
non-criminal sanctions such as censure.
The third form of legislative fact is that involving policy. It
is exemplified by the federal rulemakers' decision that the law of
federal discovery should frown on the deliberate mix of signifi-
cant and insignificant documents in the hope of obscuring the
significant ones." '
State judicial rulemakers' findings on all three forms of leg-
islative fact can also be found. During the promulgation of a set
of evidence rules, the Ohio judicial rulemakers determined that
the Ohio Supreme Court did possess the constitutionally recog-
nized authority to adopt rules of evidence. 3 6 This is a "current
legal fact" determination. Evidently, during the Oklahoma Su-
preme Court's promulgation of a new rule on lawyer advertising,
a determination was made that public policy in Oklahoma
should frown upon lawyers who advertise. 7 This illustrates leg-
islative factfinding that involves policy. A determination of dis-
cretion - to require complaining parties in civil suits to inform
their adversaries of the factual basis of their grievances - is
embodied in Oregon's system of code pleading.
VI. Principles for Hearings on Factual Issues in the Judicial
Rulemaking Context
Because of the diversity of judicial rulemakers and judicial
rules within the many American judicial systems, no single
method of conducting hearings on any factual issues underlying
234. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 101 Wis. 2d 90, 136, 303 N.W.2d 639, 660-
61 (Wis. 1981) (Rule determinations sometimes turn on findings of fact, policy choices,
risk assessment and predictions of the future.). See also FCC v. National Citzens Comm.
for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 813-14 (1978) (factual determinations of primarily a judg-
mental or predictive nature); see generally Davis, supra note 225, at 937 (suggesting
category of "evaluative facts" needs to be added to judgmental or predictive facts).
235. See Amendments, supra note 74, at 532 (Advisory Committee Note to FED. R.
Civ. P. 34(b), which follows the suggestions of the A.B.A. Litigation Section Report on
both adjudicative and legislative facts).
236. The Legislature did not agree. See supra text accompanying note 177.
237. See supra note 221.
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judicial rules can be devised by judicial rulemakers. Neverthe-
less, the experiences of American judicial rulemakers do suggest
several principles that should usually be followed in hearings on
factual issues during judicial rulemaking proceedings. These
principles relate to the process of recognizing, debating and
resolving factual issues germane to judicial rules.
A. Recognize the Factual Issues
In undertaking any rulemaking responsibility, a judicial
rulemaker must become sensitive to the different types of fac-
tual questions that underlie the judicial rules under discussion.
Although it is appropriate for a judicial rulemaker to be
prompted to consider new rules because of a perception that the
present judicial rules are ineffective, and that the rulemaker has
the authority to recommend or adopt more effective rules, these
perceptions should be viewed as preliminary observations, sub-
ject to change if contrary information is presented. The respon-
sibility for judicial rulemaking is not delegated to a judicial
rulemaker because the rulemaker will inevitably resolve the nec-
essary factual issues accurately. In fact, judicial rulemakers
often lack substantial experience in the arena in which the judi-
cial rules govern. 8s Adjudicative factfinding involving how the
present rules are understood and how they operate often re-
quires an inquiry by social scientists. Legislative facts concern-
ing the scope of the judicial rulemaker's authority sometimes
compel the attention of those who are not involved or those who
do not have a direct interest in the exercise of rulemaking
authority.
Accordingly, at the beginning of deliberations on proposed
judicial rules, judicial rulemakers should recognize the factual is-
sues by spelling out the subject areas of the possible rule
changes to be discussed. They should list the adjudicative and
legislative factual premises supporting the decision to consider
the subject areas, together with any significant drafts of pro-
posed judicial rule changes and any commentary, regardless of
origin. In addition, they should explain their authority to engage
238. Consider the possible inexperience of the "public member" of the Oregon
Council on Court Procedures. See OR. REV. STAT. § 1.730(1)(f) (1983).
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in the rulemaking discussion. This information should then be
circulated to the interested parties.
The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of the United
States Judicial Conference performed these tasks commendably
during its recent consideration of discovery rule changes. Al-
though its factfinding inquiries were made easier by several
groups interested in the Committee's work,' 9 the Committee en-
sured from the start of its work that all information assembled
which was relevant to its factual inquiries was circulated in or-
der to elicit valuable comments. If any criticism can be leveled,
it is that the Committee appears to have relied on information
gathered by, and involving, those engaged in legal practice. Per-
haps private litigants subjected to discovery abuses, or prompt-
ing them, should have been heard.
By contrast, the Oklahoma Supreme Court's promulgation
of a new rule on lawyer advertising was largely based on a bar
association report that was founded on policy and discretionary
determinations susceptible to much debate but which was never
circulated for comment. Furthermore, the Ohio Supreme Court's
early attempts to establish rules of evidence were largely
founded on important Advisory Committee's findings that never
accompanied the Committee's proposed set of rules when the
court submitted those rules to the Ohio General Assembly for
consideration. These findings included conclusions that the judi-
cial rulemaking activity was legally proper and that Ohio policy
on evidence should track federal policy. However, these conclu-
sions were not supported by factual and analytical data. There-
fore, these determinations were not accepted by the Ohio Gen-
eral Assembly.
Whether a judicial rulemaker involved in the early stages of
judicial rule deliberations has reached tentative decisions about
the relevant facts or has only identified the relevant facts, that
rulemaker must possess the means by which the relevant facts
can be further studied. This is so for no other reason than that it
may be found upon further study that the judicial rulemaker has
failed to recognize all relevant factual issues. Our illustrations of
judicial rulemaking demonstrate that an "early-stage judicial
239. The A.B.A. Section on Litigation and the Federal Judicial Center provided re-
ports on the abuse of pleading. See supra text accompanying notes 64-67, 76-81.
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rulemaker" may be provided with information by groups, such
as bar associations, who are interested in changing the judicial
rules. However, the rulemaker cannot always rely upon these
outside sources of information because they often do not exist.
Even where they do exist, they may not be impartial.2 40
The federal judicial system provides an example of a system
whose judicial rulemakers can gather information without rely-
ing on outside studies. Both the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts and the Federal Judicial Center can per-
form studies to assist the various rulemakers within the Judicial
Conference. The Administrative Office and the Federal Judicial
Center are in regular communication with the judges and nonju-
dicial staff members of varying federal courts, and thus can eas-
ily both question and inform these members on matters perti-
nent to judicial rulemaking activity. On a local level, federal law
mandates the creation of entities such as appellate court advi-
sory committees and circuit judicial conferences which can also
gather information for federal judicial rulemakers 41
If external sources of information are needed, the American
Bar Association and other non-governmental associations of law-
yers, as well as individual lawyers admitted to practice before
federal courts can be enlisted to help federal judicial rulemakers
gather information. A recent illustration of a rulemaker that
used both internal and external sources to gather information is
the Judicial Conference's ongoing consideration of admission to
practice standards for federal trial courts. While considering
possible rule changes, the Conference has sponsored pilot pro-
grams in several trial courts and is monitoring closely the results
of its experiments.242
240. "As long as the regulators are indistinguishable from those they regulate, it is
impossible to tell when the public interest stops and the self-interest starts." Sims, After
Lawyer Advertising, What?, 50 OKLA. B.A. J. 1367, 1371 (1979).
241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2077(b) (1982) (appellate court advisory committees to study
the rules of practice and internal operating procedures); 28 U.S.C. § 333 (1982) (circuit
judicial conferences advise chief judges of the circuits on the means of improving the
administration of justice).
242. 15 THIRD BRANCH 7 (1983). In large part, these experiments can be traced to
two influential reports. Final Report of the Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules for
Admission to Practice, 67 F.R.D. 159 (1976) (known as the Clare Committee Report);
Final Report of the Committee to Consider Standards for Admission to Practice in the
Federal Courts to the Judicial Conference of the United States, 83 F.R.D. 215 (1979)
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Finally, it sometimes happens that problems with existing
judicial rules are not immediately recognized by any judicial
rulemaker or brought to its attention by any major outside
sources. In such a case, it is imperative that a known and open
channel of communication to the early-stage judicial rulemaker
exists so that anyone who wants to suggest judicial rule changes
can submit proposed changes, together with their reasons for
present disenchantment.24 8 Establishment and use of this com-
municative channel would effectively allow a judicial rulemaking
body to begin to gather information on judicial rules not yet for-
mally the subject of any judicial rulemaker's deliberations. Thus,
revision proposals could be followed by undertaking an internal
study to be completed even before formal judicial rule delibera-
tions begin.2
B. Debate the Factual Issues
Once an early-stage judicial rulemaker has reached firm,
though not final, conclusions about the propriety of certain judi-
cial rules and their underlying factual premises, more wide-
spread debate on these conclusions and findings should begin.
Of course, to ensure that all pertinent information is forwarded
to the judicial rulemaker prior to any final conclusions, the in-
terim conclusions should be widely circulated, to give those who
want to comment an adequate opportunity to do so. The meth-
ods of circulation should depend upon the nature of the judicial
rules under consideration; the more socially significant the rule,
the more widespread the circulation should be. Persons or
(known as the Devitt Committee Report). Similar use of internal and external sources, as
well as experimentation, occurred during the Florida Supreme Court's recent considera-
tion of new rules on the access of the electronic media to courtrooms. See In re Petition
of Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc., 370 So. 2d 764 (1979).
243. See generally NDRPR, supra note 3, § 3 (Petition for Adoption, Amendment
or Repeal of Procedural Rule, Administrative Rule, or Administrative Order to the ulti-
mate rulemaker). Cf. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 2.52.050(2) (Supp. 1984-1985) (Judicial
Council, though not itself a final stage judicial rulemaker, receives suggestions from any-
one on possible rule changes.).
244. North Dakota has a similar procedure. A petition to the North Dakota Su-
preme Court for a rule change is followed by either an immediate decision, NDRPR,
supra note 3, at § 3.5, a hearing, or a standing committee review, id. §§ 3.3, 3.5. Cf.
WASH. Rzv. CODE ANN. § 2.52.050(1) (Supp. 1984-1985) (providing for continuous study
and surveying of the judicial system).
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groups with particular interest in a proposed rule should be sent
individualized notice. The opportunity to comment should also
depend upon the nature of the proposed rules, and on the
strength of the factual premises underlying the proposed
changes. Politically sensitive rules require particularly generous
opportunities to be heard. Both controversial adjudicative facts,
which might typically involve what is occurring within the judi-
cial system, and controversial legislative facts, which might typi-
cally involve the existence and scope of the judicial rulemaker's
authority, may require a vigorous trial-type proceeding before
the judicial rulemaker. Any oral presentation of information (in-
cluding evidence and opinion) may need to be followed by an
opportunity for the rulemaker, as well as others, to ask
questions.
Debate need not be restricted to trial-type hearings. The
opportunity to submit written comments to the judicial
rulemaker regarding the options available on factual issues is an-
other common format. This opportunity should include the abil-
ity to respond to the comments upon documents previously sub-
mitted to the rulemaker, and upon documents created by the
rulemaker itself.
Hearings at which the judicial rulemaker entertains oral
presentations should be conducted like traditional legislative
committee hearings. These hearings should be transcribed, and
the transcripts should be available to all interested parties, in-
cluding later-stage judicial and nonjudicial rulemakers. Hearings
at which oral testimony is received should provide an opportu-
nity for cross-examination by persons other than the judicial
rulemakers and its staff members. Cross-examination is some-
times needed even though those appearing before judicial
rulemakers are not prone to intentional falsehoods. When the
interpretation of certain empirical data is at issue (such as
whether the increase in the number of motions for sanctions re-
garding deficient pleadings means that lawyers have become less
careful or otherwise less competent in their drafting of plead-
ings), cross-examination would permit the most immediate, dra-
matic and informed confrontations between those with different
interpretations of the data. These confrontations should occur
during the deliberations on rules which involve a delicate bal-
ancing of competing social values, since public sensitivity to the
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tensions involved in certain judicial rules would be heightened
and public acceptance of forthcoming rules would be facilitated.
Finally, the nature of the debate within a judicial rulemak-
ing procedure should change as the judicial rule under discus-
sion moves from the early stages of consideration to the later
stages. In addition, the nature of the debate should be influ-
enced by whether a nonjudicial rulemaker, for instance, the state
legislature, is involved in the rulemaking endeavors either before
or after involvement by any judicial rulemakers.
During the early stages of judicial rulemaking, the debate
should focus on assembling noncontroversial facts. At this stage,
the rulemaker should try to resolve all controversial adjudicative
facts and current legal facts regarding the rulemaker's authority
and the like. During the later stages, the debate should focus on
the legislative facts involving issues of "policy and discretion.
245
A judicial rulemaking procedure should address questions, such
as whether and how to curb instances of lawyer abuse of the civil
pleading rules, only after questions regarding the extent of pre-
vailing abuses and the legitimacy of the judicial rulemakers' ef-
forts to curb such abuses have been answered.
Typically, if judicial rulemakers do not possess the exclusive
authority to consider and promulgate judicial rules, their con-
duct will be subject to some form of legislative review. Of course,
this review of judicial rulemaking activity provides yet another
opportunity for recognition, debate and resolution of factual is-
sues relevant to proposed changes to judicial rules. To the extent
that this review is expected to, or usually does, entail an in-
depth inquiry, the earlier debate before judicial rulemakers on
legislative facts need not be quite as extensive. For example,
representative legislators may refrain from very active participa-
tion in the judicial rulemaking debate because they have an op-
portunity to participate when they approve the rules. After all,
it is most appropriate for an elected, representative legislature
245. The use of differing standards to review the rulemaking procedure at the later
stages of judicial rulemaking should be similar to the standards courts employ to review
the facts found by administrative agencies. Watkins & Beck, Judicial Review of
Rulemaking Under the Texas Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act, 34
BAYLOR L. Rv. 1, 34-36 (1982) (reviewing both Texas and Florida law). See Aetna Life
Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 101 Wis. 2d 90, 125-27, 303 N.W.2d 639, 655-56 (Wis. 1981) (review-
ing Wisconsin law).
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to balance competing social values inherent in a particularly sen-
sitive judicial rule.
C. Resolve the Factual Issues
Judicial rulemaking procedures necessarily involve an evolu-
tionary process. As discussed, different judicial rulemakers are
responsible for focusing on different factual issues during the va-
rious stages of the rulemaking process. Certain principles re-
garding the resolution of factual issues underlie the stages of
this evolutionary process.
Early on in judicial rulemaking deliberations, the judicial
rulemaker should concentrate on identifying the factual issues
which trigger judicial rulemaking activity. These factual issues
can be largely adjudicative; the recent changes in the federal
civil discovery rules were prompted by perceptions that prevail-
ing discovery tools were "misused and overused" and the subject
of "abuse." Or, the factual issues can be legislative; the recent
Oklahoma judicial rules on lawyer advertising were triggered by
a United States Supreme Court decision declaring earlier judi-
cial rules unconstitutional. In contrast to the federal discovery
rules, the need for change in the Oklahoma rules did not ema-
nate from a suggestion of misuse, overuse, or abuse of the old
rules. There would have been no change in Oklahoma's rules on
lawyer advertising without Bates v. Arizona State Bar
Association.2"6
Early identification and resolution of factual issues prompt-
ing judicial rulemaking should be followed by examinations,
findings, and review of the factual issues underlying possible
rule changes. During the early stages of the rulemaking process,
most attention should usually be focused on adjudicative
factfinding and legislative factfinding involving legal facts, with
resolutions always being deemed tentative and thus subject to
review during some later stage. These early resolutions should
be explicit and should be accompanied by commentary on the
evidentiary, policy, and other bases for the rulemakers' prelimi-
nary findings. Transcripts and other records should be main-
tained so that information received and considered by the early-
246. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
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stage rulemaker can be reviewed.247 During the later stages of
rulemaking, attention should shift to legislative factfinding in-
volving policy and discretion, with only minimal review of the
adjudicative and legal facts which underlie decisions on policy
and discretion.
If judicial rulemaking is followed by the involvement of
such nonjudicial rulemakers as the U.S. Congress or a represen-
tative state legislative body, the nonjudicial rulemakers' involve-
ment should normally be limited to a review of the legislative
facts involving policy and discretion.48 Of course, the prospect
of nonjudicial rulemaker's involvement may serve to fashion the
manner in which later-stage judicial rulemaking occurs.249
VII. Conclusion
Notwithstanding the great diversity in judicial rules and in
judicial rulemakers within the many American judicial systems,
a consensus has developed that each system ought to strive for
247. See Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert.
denied 417 U.S. 921 (1974). In Portland Cement, Judge Leventhal stated regarding ad-
ministrative agency rulemaking: "It is not consonant with the purpose of a rule-making
proceeding to promulgate rules... on data that, [to a] critical degree, is known only to
the agency." Id. at 393.
248. Accord Weinstein, supra note 1, at 943 (Congress should restrict its review of
judicial rules to "consideration of the larger policy issues, rather than involve itself in the
details of rulemaking").
249. The foregoing analysis is founded on the view that factual premises underlying
judicial rules are recognized, debated, and then finally resolved. However, there are situ-
ations in which the factual resolutions leading to rule promulgation come under post-
promulgation scrutiny. For example, the data on which the resolutions were made may
be released only after rule promulgation. E.g., Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus,
486 F.2d at 392-94. In such instances, public process judicial rulemaking must continue
after the initial resolutions. See id. at 393 (Criticisms of data released by agency after its
rulemaking was completed must be considered by the agency, since further agency action
was possible.); Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 421 A.2d 190 (1980) (Although a deci-
sion two years earlier found that giving arbitration panels exclusive original jurisdiction
over all malpractice claims was constitutional, the panels are now declared to be uncon-
stitutional in light of experience.). To alleviate the problems in adjusting new rules based
on experience under the rules, some judicial rulemakers promulgate "experimental"
rules. See, e.g., Clare Committee Report, supra note 242; Gen. Law Sec., 49 U.S.L.W.
2335 (Nov. 18, 1980) (reporting Maryland Court of Appeals' experiment in allowing
broadcast coverage of both trial and appellate court proceedings). And consider the pro-
posed changes to the federal civil procedure rule on local rulemaking. Court Rules, 98
F.R.D. 337, 370 (1983) (proposed amendment to FaD. R. Civ. P. 83, which would allow
local rules on an experimental basis).
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greater "public process" in its judicial rulemaking procedure.
That consensus has begun to prompt changes, which are leading
to more open and accessible judicial rulemaking procedures.
An open and accessible judicial rulemaking process must in-
clude procedures by which factual issues underlying judicial rule
changes are adequately recognized, fully debated, and rationally
resolved. Factual issues include both adjudicative and legislative
facts. Because there are differences in these two general catego-
ries of facts, the procedures of the rulemaking mechanisms for
handling these facts must be varied.
Considerations other than whether the decisions involve an
adjudicative or legislative fact should also prompt variations in
the procedures for factfinding during judicial rulemaking. One
such consideration is the stage within the judicial rulemaking
procedure at which the judicial rule and its factual issues reside.
Another consideration is the nature of the judicial rulemaking
authority: advisory, fettered, or unfettered. Yet another consid-
eration is the extent of the judicial rulemaker's personal famili-
arity with the judicial rule under discussion and the nature of
the underlying factual issues.
Although the process of factfinding in judicial rulemaking
must be tailored to the particular judicial rulemaker, certain
guiding principles can be suggested. A court rule or statute
should be adopted to facilitate consistent judicial rulemaking
procedures and to ensure the necessary sensitivity to the
factfinding chores involved in rulemaking. Adjudicative facts
and the form of legislative facts characterized as current legal
facts must be addressed during the early stages of judicial
rulemaking, while legislative facts involving policy and discre-
tion are best left for serious attention in the later stages. Judi-
cial rulemakers should be provided the internal means of gather-
ing information necessary to the resolution of relevant factual
issues, although at times they must commission outside assis-
tance. Judicial rulemakers should also seek to have available,
uncommissioned, external sources of information. However, they
cannot rely exclusively on these sources. The judicial rulemaking
process should be open and accessible. Notice and the opportu-
nity to be heard should be provided for those interested in as-
sisting the rulemakers to resolve the controversial facts. The evi-
dentiary record, including public comments, used by the various
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rulemakers during their deliberations should be kept on file.
Commentary that supports the judicial rulemaker's final factual
decisions should be included with the final proposals and rule
changes. A rulemaking procedure should include the opportunity
for outsiders to petition to initiate a rulemaking inquiry. Finally,
factfinding during judicial rulemaking, like factfinding during
other forms of lawmaking, should not proceed on the basis of
data that is known only to the judicial rulemaker, or on data
that is inadequate, or on data that has been misinterpreted by
the judicial rulemaker. Outsiders must have an opportunity to
correct the misinterpretations. Open and accessible judicial
rulemaking procedures must include opportunities for meaning-
ful hearings on the factual premises underlying new judicial
rules.
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